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Abstract 
The fallout from the financial crisis continues to inform the development 
of corporate and securities law, and the new regulatory landscape for eco-
nomic activity within the United States is beginning to take form.  This evolu-
tionary process, however, has been anything but stable or certain.  As might 
be expected, in concert with such momentous change in law and policy, re-
criminations for and associated investigations of past activity continue to 
affect competent regulators as well as market participants.  Nevertheless, 
while many of the underlying causes of the financial crisis are now better 
understood by both policy makers and scholars, the question remains – given 
where we were, where do we go from here?  While a definitive answer to such 
a question remains elusive, an additional perspective on the ethical issues of 
relevance to corporate and securities law may be helpful in considering the 
possible alternatives.  In particular, the ethical rules of corporate gatekeep-
ers in conflicts of interest scenarios are worthy of further consideration and 
discussion. 
This article presents the argument that cases involving conflicts of in-
terest in the corporate and securities law space may be viewed as primarily 
calling into question the ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper.  In support 
of such an argument, this article sets forth a framework for conflicts of inter-
est scenarios that takes into account four categories of legal rules – activity 
rules, disclosure rules, liability rules and ethical rules.  In adopting such a 
framework, this article will elaborate on an ethical perspective will be elabo-
rated to address the ongoing development of corporate and securities law.  
Further, this article proposes further analysis in relation to disclosure rules 
on conflicts of interest policies for Compensation Committees as mandated by 
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Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act. 
This article is the second in a series that explores the intersection of 
corporate law and legal ethics.1  Specifically, the present discussion concerns 
the foundations in doctrine and theory that may apply to issues of conflicts of 
interest within the ambit of corporate and securities law.  Accordingly, the 
subject matter for discussion includes both rules of the professions – or first-
order ethical rules – and rules as may be prescribed by the competent author-
ity – that is, second-order ethical rules. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. 
If you think about that, you’ll do things differently. 
– Warren Buffett2 
  
 1. See, e.g., Christopher T. Hines, Returning to First Principles of Privilege 
Law:  Focusing on the Facts in Internal Corporate Investigations, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 
33 (2011). 
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“Reputation is a fleeting thing.”3  In the world of high finance, a master 
of the universe today can quickly become tomorrow’s cautionary tale.4  It is, 
therefore, unsurprising to find that in the aftermath of the financial crisis5 the 
professional reputations of numerous market actors and policy makers have 
experienced this very reversal of fortune.6  In many cases one may credibly 
  
(“Whatever the strict legal status of the share purchases Mr. Buffett’s now-departed 
colleague, David Sokol, made in Lubrizol, they look impossible to justify from an 
ethical standpoint.”).  As recounted in the report of the Audit Committee of Berkshire 
Hathaway to its Board of Directors, David Sokol, former Chairman of several Berk-
shire subsidiaries, engaged in certain purchases of shares of The Lubrizol Corporation 
prior to its acquisition by Berkshire in an all-cash transaction.  Memorandum from the 
Audit Committee, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. to the Board of Directors, Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc., Trading in Lubrizol Corporation Shares by David L. Sokol, (Apr. 26, 
2011), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news /APR2711.pdf.  As a 
result of such revelations, Mr. Sokol resigned from Berkshire Hathaway.  See News 
Release, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Warren E. Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, 
Announces the Resignation of David L. Sokol (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.berk shirehathaway.com/news/MAR3011.pdf. 
 3. Although reputation itself may have an evanescent quality, it would appear 
that practitioners of law have long understood this momentary aspect of one’s profes-
sional reputation.  See, e.g., Hon. William A. Sutherland, The Facts in the Case, Lec-
ture to Law Students of Rochester, New York (1895), in 3 AM. LAW. 544, 545 (1895) 
(“Reputation is a fleeting thing.  There is not one here tonight who can name twenty 
lawyers prominent fifty years ago.  We pass into forgetfulness as the farmer and the 
merchant and the hackdriver, and when we appear before another tribunal from which 
there is no appeal it will be better for us to have done our duty by our clients than 
have sought a little cheap glory for ourselves.”). 
 4. See, e.g., TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987) (telling the 
fictional tale of the downfall of Sherman McCoy, Wall Street hotshot and self-
proclaimed “Master of the Universe”).  Although many in the United States still suf-
fer from the resulting effects of the financial crisis, the national mood has yet to reach 
that which existed in Florence on February 7, 1497.  See, e.g., DAVID HACKETT 
FISCHER, THE GREAT WAVE:  PRICE REVOLUTIONS AND THE RHYTHM OF HISTORY 67-
68 (1996) (describing the so-called “burning of the vanities,” during which crowds of 
Florentines burned paintings, books, and other symbols of luxury in an attempt to 
seek atonement for their sins).  Unlike the historical Florentines, we have yet to burn 
away the purported occasions of sin – that is, our credit cards, overpriced homes and 
various personal effects purchased in the age of easy credit.  See, e.g., Consumer 
Credit, FED. RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE,  (Aug. 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/g19/20110805/g19.htm (“Consumer credit 
increased at an annual rate of 4-1/4 percent in the second quarter.  In June, consumer 
credit increased at an annual rate of 7-3/4 percent, with revolving credit increasing at 
a rate of 8 percent and nonrevolving credit increasing at a rate of 7-1/2 percent.”). 
 5. For purposes of this Article, I continue to adopt the commonly used phrase of 
“financial crisis” to refer to the late 2000s global financial crisis.  See, e.g., Hines, 
supra note 1, at 37 n.20. 
 6. See, e.g., ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM – 
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argue that such criticisms may be unfounded or excessive,7 nevertheless, the 
fact remains that financial disaster has its consequences.8  One of these con-
sequences is that the reputation of those persons in positions of economic 
influence and authority will, by necessity, suffer.9 
The fallout from the financial crisis continues to inform the development 
of corporate and securities law, and the new regulatory landscape for eco-
nomic activity within the United States is beginning to take form.10  This 
evolutionary process, however, has been anything but stable or certain.11  As 
might be expected, in concert with such momentous change in law and pol-
icy, recriminations for and associated investigations of past activity continue 
to affect competent regulators as well as market participants.12  Nevertheless, 
  
AND THEMSELVES 85 (2009) (“By the summer of 2007, however, America’s second 
Gilded Age had come shockingly to an end, and [former Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan] Greenspan’s reputation lay in tatters.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Bill George, Why Leaders Lose Their Way, HBR BLOG NETWORK 
(June 8, 2011) http://blogs.hbr.org/hbsfaculty/2011/06/why-leaders-lose-their-
way.html (“It’s lonely at the top, because leaders know they are ultimately responsi-
ble for the lives and fortunes of people.  If they fail, many get deeply hurt.  They often 
deny the burdens and loneliness, becoming incapable of facing reality.  They shut 
down their inner voice, because it is too painful to confront or even acknowledge; it 
may, however, appear in their dreams as they try to resolve conflicts rustling around 
inside their heads.”). 
 8. See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2011) (“The economic 
impact of the crisis has been devastating.  And the human devastation is continuing.  
The officially reported unemployment rate hovered at almost 10% in November 2010, 
but the underemployment rate, which includes those who have given up looking for 
work and part-time workers who would prefer to be working full-time, was above 
17%.  And the share of unemployed workers who have been out of work for more 
than six months was just above 40%.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Bush’s Final Approval Rating: 22 Percent, CBSNEWS, Feb. 11, 
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/16/opinion/polls/main4728399.shtml 
(“President Bush will leave office as one of the most unpopular departing presidents 
in history, according to a new CBS News/New York Times poll showing Mr. Bush’s 
final approval rating at 22 percent.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5301-5641). 
 11. See Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Doing the Right Thing, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 691, 
694 (1992) [hereinafter Hazard, Doing the Right Thing]; Hines, supra note 1, at 59 
n.123. 
 12. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct that Led to or Arose 
from the Financial Crisis, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov 
/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last updated Jan. 9, 2013) (reporting key statistics 
through January 9, 2013 on seventy entities and individuals charged, and $1.65 billion 
in total penalties, disgorgement, and other monetary relief). 
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while many of the underlying causes of the financial crisis are now better 
understood by both policy makers and scholars, the question remains – given 
where we were, where do we go from here? 
While a definitive answer to such a question remains elusive, an addi-
tional perspective on the ethical issues related to corporate and securities law 
may be helpful in considering the possible alternative answers to the question 
posed.13  In particular, the ethical rules of corporate gatekeepers14 in conflicts 
of interest scenarios are worthy of further consideration and discussion.15  
This Article presents the argument that cases involving conflicts of interest in 
  
 13. This Article is the second in a series that explores the intersection of corpo-
rate law and legal ethics.  See Hines, supra note 1.  Specifically, the present discus-
sion concerns the foundations in doctrine and theory that may apply to issues of con-
flicts of interest within the ambit of corporate and securities law.  Accordingly, the 
subject matter for discussion includes both rules of the professions – or first-order 
ethical rules – and rules as may be prescribed by the competent authority – that is, 
second-order ethical rules.  See infra Part II.D. 
 14. In concert with the ongoing scholarship of corporate gatekeepers, this Article 
will adopt the definition of the corporate gatekeeper as enunciated by Professor John 
Coffee.  JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 2 (2006) (“[T]he gatekeeper is an agent who acts as a reputational in-
termediary to assure investors as to the quality of the ‘signal’ sent by the corporate 
issuer.  The reputational intermediary does so by lending or ‘pledging’ its reputational 
capital to the corporation, thus enabling investors or the market to rely on the corpora-
tion’s own disclosures or assurances where they otherwise might not.”).  This said, it 
is important to note that the term “gatekeeper” is a metaphor, and is not a description 
as such.  Indeed, in cases where an in-house legal department hires the services of an 
independent firm on difficult legal disputes, the reputation of such an independent 
firm may include the ability – either real or imagined – of obtaining favorable results 
in questionable cases.  Accordingly, in connection with the notion of the corporate 
gatekeeper as a reputational intermediary, the gatekeeper in question may also be 
viewed as an “usher.”  Here, the function of the “usher” – again, in a metaphorical 
sense – would be to ensure that that certain persons (or things) would proceed through 
the gate to their (or its) proper place, with only the most egregious cases being 
stopped in transit.  In this sense, corporate attorneys often serve a function that more 
resembles that of the usher in that their incentives are often such that passing the gate 
(e.g., successfully closing a corporate transaction) is deemed the optimum of profes-
sional performance.  I thank Professor Hazard for making these important observa-
tions. 
 15. The first article in this series explored the longstanding debate concerning 
the appropriate limits of the attorney-client privilege in connection with an internal 
corporate investigation.  See Hines, supra note 1, at 39.  In turn, this second article 
will explore the interplay of another core set of rules for legal ethics – that is, conflicts 
of interest rules.  Although each of these articles should be considered separate inquir-
ies into the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics, the hope and intent is that 
applying these two important sets of rules of legal ethics (i.e., privilege and conflicts 
rules) to current developments in corporate and securities law will assist further re-
search in such areas of scholarship. 
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the corporate and securities law space may be viewed as primarily calling into 
question the ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper.16 
In support of such an argument, Part II of this Article sets forth a 
framework for conflicts of interest scenarios that takes into account four cate-
gories of legal rules – activity rules, disclosure rules, liability rules and ethical 
rules.  Specifically, the discussion of each of the categories of legal rules will 
proceed as follows: (i) for activity rules, the restrictions on services offered 
by auditors pursuant to section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act;17 (ii) for li-
ability rules, the ongoing debate concerning whether secondary liability under 
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act18 should be available to federal securities 
class action plaintiffs in light of the Court’s decisions in Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver19 and Stoneridge Investment Part-
ners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.;20 (iii) for disclosure rules, proxy disclo-
sure rules in relation to codes of ethics for senior financial officers21 and 
compensation committee independence standards;22 and (iv) for ethical rules, 
the relevant rules concerning conflicts of interest as provided in the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility,23 the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct24 and the Attorney Conduct Rules.25  In adopting such a framework, an 
ethical perspective will be elaborated to address matters within the ongoing 
development of corporate and securities law.26 
  
 16. Of note, the question of conflicts of interest necessarily implicates questions 
as to the independence of the corporate gatekeeper.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2012) (“Loyalty and independent judgment are es-
sential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”).  As will be discussed, the 
new rules on independence standards for Compensation Committees as part of the 
Dodd-Frank reforms provide an area where one may further explore the more practi-
cal application of the discussion provided herein.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 17. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66).   
 18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 19. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 20. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 21. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406. 
 22. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5301-5641). 
 23. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY CANONS 5, 9 (1981). 
 24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.13 (2012). 
 25. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2012). 
 26. Given the plethora of regulations that have been or will be promulgated by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other administrative agencies 
pursuant to Dodd-Frank, by necessity this Article will limit its focus to one regulatory 
rule of interest.  Specifically, this Article focuses on the independence standards for 
Compensation Committees and related proxy disclosure that is currently under con-
sideration.  See Dodd-Frank § 952; Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, 
76 Fed. Reg. 18966-01 (Apr. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240); see 
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Part III of this Article will discuss in greater detail the primacy of ethical 
rules of the corporate gatekeeper by first comparing the categories of con-
flicts rules as initially described in Part II.  In making such a comparison, I 
will argue for an ethical perspective in instances where the corporate gate-
keeper is an actor.27  Further, I will suggest that such an ethical perspective 
may also engage with recent scholarly discourse regarding the theoretical 
approaches taken in each of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.28  As a means of further sub-
stantiating this line of reasoning, I propose further analysis in relation to dis-
closure rules on conflicts of interest policies for Compensation Committees as 
mandated by Dodd Frank,29 and provides some concluding thoughts on the 
manner in which an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper may be 
more broadly considered as part of the ongoing development of corporate and 
securities law.30 
II.  CATEGORIES OF CONFLICTS RULES 
The categorization of legal rules is a method of inquiry that facilitates 
further discussion of matters involving legal theory.31  Without doubt, the 
precise definition and resulting scope of any category so constructed may be 
  
also Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act – 
Accomplishments, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov 
/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml (last modified Sept. 7, 2012) (“[Dodd-
Frank] contains more than 90 provisions that require SEC rulemaking, and dozens of 
other provisions that give the SEC discretionary rulemaking authority.  Of the manda-
tory rulemaking provisions, the SEC has proposed or adopted rules for about three-
quarters of them.”).  
 27. In arguing for the primacy of ethical rules in this instance, I do not argue for 
the relative unimportance of other categories of conflicts rules – i.e., activity rules, 
liability rules, and disclosure rules.  Indeed, the federal securities regulatory scheme 
can be viewed as including all of the categories of conflicts rules as discussed herein.  
Nevertheless, the argument made will be that ethical rules should be of primary con-
sideration because of their implications on the other categories of conflicts rules.  
Accordingly, the extent to which one may be able to determine the nature and quality 
of ethical rules may illuminate further discussion of activity rules, liability rules, and 
disclosure rules as part of the ongoing scholarship in this area of law. 
 28. Here, this Article keeps in mind the discussion amongst Professors Geoffrey 
Hazard, David Luban, and Michael Millemann with respect to the theoretical founda-
tions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991) [hereinafter Hazard, The Fu-
ture of Legal Ethics]; David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics 
Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995). 
 29. See Dodd-Frank § 952. 
 30. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 31. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Categories, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE:  
THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 3, 3-24 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). 
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challenged,32 which may ultimately lead to a negative thesis that the categori-
zation itself is meaningless.33  Nevertheless, any categorization of legal rules 
should ultimately be assessed as to whether it facilitates inquiry into matters 
under consideration.34  The question, therefore, is not whether the categories 
are true or correct in an absolute sense, but rather, whether such categories 
inform the argument being presented.35 
Part II of this Article presents one possible categorization of legal rules 
concerning conflicts of interest within the context of corporate and securities 
law.36  Specifically, this Part sets forth a framework for further discussion by 
  
 32. With respect to the categories set forth in this Article, for instance, one might 
argue that the distinction between disclosure rules and liability rules is without differ-
ence, as a matter of practice.  For does not the public company in the United States 
follow the particular disclosure rules of federal securities regulation in the shadow of 
its potential liability under the general anti-fraud liability rule?  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.1016 (2012).  Indeed, much of this makes sense.  
Nevertheless, the intended purpose of this categorization is to argue in favor of the 
primacy of ethical rules within the context of corporate and securities law where the 
corporate gatekeeper is an actor.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 33. This does not mean to imply, however, that any negative thesis is without 
merit as part of scholarly discussion.  Indeed, a compelling critique of longstanding 
opinions and beliefs is often the first step toward more enlightened discussion of legal 
rules and their effects.  See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 210 (1979) (“[T]he activity of categorizing, 
analyzing, and explaining legal rules has a double motive.  On the one hand, it is an 
effort to discover the conditions of social justice.  On the other, it is an attempt to 
deny the truth of our painfully contradictory feelings about the actual state of relations 
between persons in our social world.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Paul Studtmann, Aristotle’s Categories, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHIL. (Sept. 7, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/ (“The set of 
doctrines in the Categories, which I will henceforth call categorialism, provides the 
framework of inquiry for a wide variety of Aristotle’s philosophical investigations, 
ranging from his discussions of time and change in the Physics, to the science of be-
ing qua being in the Metaphysics, and even extending to his rejection of Platonic 
ethics in the Nicomachean Ethics.”). 
 35. See supra notes 27, 33 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A.1; see also 
Hans Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An 
Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 335, 336-340 (1972) (distin-
guishing, by definition, in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem adjudicatory authority). 
 36. Although the number of possible categories of legal rules is infinite, the most 
influential remains the fundamental distinction between property rules and liability 
rules as part of the law and economics literature.  See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972); Jonathan R. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. 
REV. 965, 979-80 (1997) (“A property rule gives the holder of the right the legal 
power to prevent any other party from infringing on that right.  A liability rule does 
not give the holder of the right the legal power to prevent another party from infring-
ing, but instead gives the holder the right to obtain compensatory damages from the 
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first defining and then elaborating on four categories of conflicts rules—
namely, activity rules, liability rules, disclosure rules and ethical rules.37 
A.  Activity Rules 
The first category of legal rules concerning conflicts of interest within 
the context of corporate and securities law is called activity rules.38  In this 
context, activity rules will be defined as rules of law that prescribe the permit-
ted activity that the corporate gatekeeper may engage in as part of her profes-
sional representation of her chosen client.39  Activity rules, therefore, are 
fundamentally negative rules in that they prohibit certain activities that the 
corporate gatekeeper may undertake.40  In this sense, activity rules can be 
viewed as the most stringent of conflicts rules because their mandate is (or at 
least should be) rather clear – you can do X, but you cannot do Y.41  In many 
cases, however, activity rules will be even more straightforward – you cannot 
do X, Y, and Z.42  Accordingly, one would naturally be inclined to conclude 
that any activities that are not specifically prohibited by the given activity rule 
  
infringing party.  In operational terms, courts typically enforce property rights through 
injunctive relief, whereas liability rules are typically enforced through monetary dam-
ages.”). 
 37. See infra Parts II.A-D. 
 38. Admittedly, one could fashion a different taxonomy for the conflicts rules in 
question.  For instance, conduct rules could be an alternative phrasing of the rules that 
I have in mind.  As a means, however, of avoiding any confusion with the Attorney 
Conduct Rules, I adopt the term activity rules to provide the necessary distinction. 
 39. With respect to the corporate gatekeepers that are within the purview of this 
discussion, as a preliminary matter we may consider auditors, corporate attorneys, 
securities analysts, and the rating agencies.  See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 14, at 103-
07. 
 40. On this prohibitionary aspect of activity rules, there are similarities with 
ethical rules as discussed herein.  See infra Part II.D.  In particular, I have in mind the 
requirements of Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules, which prohibit certain activity between 
attorneys as their clients.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2012) 
(“A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual 
relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”).  
This said, the specific requirements of Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules read to certain 
representations that operate as de facto violations of the more general ethical rule on 
conflicts of interest, i.e., Model Rule 1.7.  See MODEL RULES R. 1.7.  For purposes of 
this Article, therefore, Model Rule 1.8 may be considered as an ethical rule that in its 
effects also operates as an activity rule.  See supra note 27; infra Part II.D. 
 41. On such points, activity rules often raise questions of statutory construction 
and interpretation.  Given the scope of this Article, however, such questions must 
remain without the realm of inquiry. 
 42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2006). 
9
Hines: Hines: Corporate Gatekeeper
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: HinesPaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 9:21 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:10 PM 
86 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
are permissible, provided that they are not otherwise prohibited by other ac-
tivity rules.43 
Given this prohibited/permissible nature of activity rules, it is under-
standable that they will likely become a point at issue amongst competing 
interest groups during the political enactment process.44  This effect results 
because the activity rule will delineate clear costs for those market actors who 
previously profited in the absence of such activity rules.45  And, presumably, 
such market actors will not accept the enactment of the activity rule without 
some measure of a political contest.46 
With this overview of activity rules in mind, what examples are there of 
activity rules that affect the conduct of corporate gatekeepers?  Although 
other examples of activity rules may provide insight into the manner in which 
they operate,47 perhaps the most notable instance of activity rules affecting 
  
 43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 44. On such points, the longstanding and influential scholarship on public choice 
theory provides additional discussion and illumination.  See generally RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.3 (8th ed. 2011). 
 45. See id. § 19.3, at 718 (“All this makes interest groups sound pretty bad.  But 
the real economic objection is not to interest groups but to the use of the political 
process to make economic decisions.”). 
 46. A more recent example of such a political process is the proposed “Volcker 
Rule” – named after former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker – as part 
of the Dodd-Frank Reforms.  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641).  By its terms, the Volcker Rule seeks to pro-
hibit “proprietary trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and private eq-
uity funds.”  Id.  As one might imagine, however, the devil remains in the details of 
the forthcoming regulation.  See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 4 (2011), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20stud
y%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf. 
 47. See, e.g., SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last 
modified Apr. 28, 2003) (“Investment bankers will have no role in determining what 
companies are covered by the analysts.  Research analysts will be prohibited from 
participating in efforts to solicit investment banking business, including pitches and 
roadshows.”).  Note, however, that the Global Analyst Research Settlements included 
other mandates, including what for purposes of this Article may be deemed disclosure 
rules.  See id. (“Each firm will include a disclosure on the first page of each research 
report stating that it ‘does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its 
research reports.  As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a 
conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report.’”); see also infra 
Part II.C. 
10
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the conduct of a gatekeeper is the prescribed activities of auditors as set forth 
in Sarbanes-Oxley.48 
An important part of the reforms set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley,49 section 
201 provides that certain services are outside the scope of practice of audi-
tors.50  Subject to certain restrictions,51 section 201 mandates that it is unlaw-
ful for a registered public accounting firm that performs an audit of an is-
suer,52 to contemporaneously offer to such an issuer any non-audit services, 
including the following: 
(1) “[B]ookkeeping or other services related to the accounting re-
cords or financial statements of the audit client; 
(2) [F]inancial information systems design and implementation; 
(3) [A]ppraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contri-
bution-in-kind reports; 
(4) [A]ctuarial services; 
(5) [I]nternal audit outsourcing services; 
(6) [M]anagement functions or human resources; 
(7) [B]roker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking 
services; 
(8) [L]egal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; 
and 
  
 48. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66). 
 49. For additional discussion regarding the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley, see 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 22.1 (6th ed. 2009) 
(“From a long-term perspective, perhaps the most significant aspect of Sarbanes-
Oxley is not the enhanced disclosure requirements or criminal penalties, but rather 
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act goes further than any of the earlier federal securities laws 
and amendments in dealing directly with corporate governance – an area that had 
traditionally been reserved to the states.”). 
 50. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)). 
 51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h) (permitting the rendering of tax services when such 
“activity is approved in advance by the audit committee of the issuer”). 
 52. This may be required under federal securities law and regulation. 
11
Hines: Hines: Corporate Gatekeeper
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: HinesPaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 9:21 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:10 PM 
88 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
(9) [A]ny other services that the [Public Company Accounting 
Oversight] Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible.”53 
As part of this enumerated list of prohibited activities, section 201 nota-
bly prohibits the offering of services that may otherwise have been provided 
by a financial advisor or consultant.54  And, these aforementioned specific 
activity rules were designed to address what – in the aftermath of the account-
ing scandals that preceded passage of Sarbanes Oxley – was perceived as a 
failing of the regulatory apparatus.55  Namely, auditors did not pay close 
enough attention to their audits,56 and became compromised by the allure of 
consulting fees from their clients.57 
As Professor John Coffee recounts in his important treatment on the 
subject, “the growth of consulting revenue as a proportion of accounting 
firms’ overall revenues during the 1990s was dramatic . . . .  In short, consult-
ing revenues more than doubled over this period and had come to exceed 
auditing revenues by a healthy 10 percent.”58  It is within this context that the 
economic effect of the activity rules, as set forth in section 201, should be 
considered.59  Prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the accounting firms 
could engage in financial advisory and consulting services.  After passage, 
  
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(1)-(9) (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. § 78j-1(g)(7)-(8). 
 55. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN 
THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003). 
 56. See id. at 322 (“[In an interview with Fortune magazine, Former Enron CFO 
Andrew] Fastow’s explanation of Enron’s business did not exactly provide the prom-
ised clarity.  On the contrary.  Here’s how Fastow explained Enron’s business model:  
‘We create optionality.  Enron is so much more valuable – hence our stock price – 
because we have so much more optionality embedded in our network than anyone 
else.’”). 
 57. Although the available empirical scholarship on the effects of the rise of 
consulting fees is not dispositive, nevertheless the perception remains that the ac-
counting industry changed in a fundamental manner.  See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 
14, at 150-51.  The problem, therefore, became one of culture and the often discussed 
“tone at the top.”  Id. at 151 (“In some cases, audit services may have been provided 
on such a discounted basis that auditing in effect became a ‘loss leader.’  Inherently, 
few things are more destructive to a watchdog culture that demands professional 
skepticism than to learn that is serves are so little valued as to be given away below 
cost.”). 
 58. Id. at 147.  As Professor Coffee notes, accounting and auditing revenue from 
all clients at the “Big Five” accounting firms stood at 53% in 1990, and thereafter 
declined to 34% in 1999.  Id.  In contrast, consulting revenues at these same firms 
started at 20% in 1990 and rose to 40% by 1999.  Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 1, at 41 n.41 (noting the importance of viewing 
the law in a historical context). 
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they could not.60  Additionally the new activity rules – that is to say, the pro-
hibitions on the enumerated services as set forth in section 201 – came at the 
cost of lost business opportunities for the accounting firms.61 
In this sense, activity rules can be viewed as a rather drastic (or Draco-
nian, depending on one’s perspective) form of rulemaking that seeks to curtail 
the activity in question.62  In the realm of conflict of interest rules, therefore, 
activity rules are typically used to define – or more aptly stated, to re-define – 
the realm of conduct for the corporate gatekeeper.63  Prior to the accounting 
scandals of Enron, Worldcom, and the rest, the public auditor increasingly 
came to be seen as both auditor and consultant.  When this fundamental ten-
sion between the auditor and consultant roles came to light, and the fallout 
from the accounting fraud scandals became a matter of political interest, the 
necessary political will was achieved in order to push the activity rules 
through the political process.64  Activity rules, therefore, are frequently en-
  
 60. Thus, these financial advisory and consulting services – those purported 
occasions of sin – are thrown into the bonfire.  See supra note 4.  
 61. As a practical matter, this “bottom line” of the economic effect of activity 
rules is an important consideration as to whether the activity rule in question is effi-
cient.  See, e.g., Interview by Charlie Rose with Lloyd Blankfein, CEO, Goldman 
Sachs (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.charlierose.com/view /interview/ 
10989#frame_top (“ROSE: What would happen to Goldman Sachs if you could no 
longer engage in proprietary trading?  BLANKFEIN: I think that if we eliminated all 
the activity that’s unrelated to client activity of Goldman Sachs we would probably do 
away with about 10% of our revenue.”). 
 62. Perhaps the most notable example of an activity rule in modern U.S. finan-
cial history is the famous Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which separated commercial 
and investment banking and ultimately came undone by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999.  See, e.g., RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. 
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 27 (4th ed. 2009) (“The 
once formidable wall between commercial and investment banking fell after long 
bombardment.”). 
 63. See, e.g., SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, supra 
note 47. 
 64. The final vote in favor of passage of Sarbanes-Oxley was 423-3 in the House 
and 99-0 in the Senate.  See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 348, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (July 25, 2002, 12:09 PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002 
/roll348.xml; U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes for 107th Congress – 2nd Session, U.S. 
SENATE (July 25, 2002, 4:30 PM), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call 
_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00192.  In contrast, 
Dodd-Frank passed the House by a margin of 237-192, and in the Senate on a 60-39 
vote.  Final Vote Results for Roll Call 413, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (June 
30, 2010, 6:54 PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll413.xml; U.S. Senate Roll 
Call Votes 11th Congress – 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (July 15, 2010, 2:29 PM), 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress
=111&session=2&vote=00208.  Based solely on these numbers, the relative lack of 
political consensus in the case of Dodd-Frank suggests that the appetite for activity 
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acted at moments of heightened political power, because in their effects they 
are inherently structural.65  Given that such moments of political power are an 
infrequent occurrence, however, additional categories of conflicts rules must 
be considered. 
B.  Liability Rules 
A second category of legal rules that addresses matters of conflicts of in-
terest in corporate and securities law is the category of liability rules.66  Al-
though the consideration of liability rules remains a foundational element of 
scholarly discourse,67 for purposes of this discussion I will limit the definition 
of liability rules to those legal rules that attach liability to the actions (or lack 
thereof) of the corporate gatekeeper.68  In this context, therefore, liability 
rules raise the essential question – in which circumstances should we hold the 
corporate gatekeeper liable for its actions, or failure to act, in connection with 
alleged misconduct by its client under the federal securities laws?69  While a 
definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article, and 
  
rules – for instance, in the form of the Volcker Rule – was not as prevalent as was the 
case with Sarbanes-Oxley. 
 65. Although the structure or overall form of corporate law and its intersection 
with legal ethics merits additional inquiry, such matters will be reserved for the third 
article in this series. 
 66. Again, one could argue for a different taxonomy in relation to such legal 
rules.  See supra note 38.  However, given that the term liability rules is frequently 
used in the literature, I adopt such language for purposes of this discussion.  See, e.g., 
Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 36, at 1092.  This said, the question that necessarily 
arises with liability rules is who owes the liability to whom.  Liability rules in this 
broader context, while certainly worthy of further discussion, are not what is intended 
for consideration in this Article.  Rather, in invoking the term liability rules, I speak 
to gatekeeper liability rules – that is, the legal rules that attach liability to the actions 
or inactions of the corporate gatekeeper.   
 67. See, e.g., Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 36, at 1110 (“[O]nce a liability 
rule is decided upon, perhaps for efficiency reasons, it is then employed to favor dis-
tributional goals as well.”). 
 68. See supra note 66. 
 69. In public discourse, this question is often phrased – where were the gate-
keepers?  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gate-
keepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1408-09 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee, Under-
standing Enron].  The implicit premise in posing such a question is that the gatekeep-
ers were not there – a place they should have been – and therefore were in some man-
ner absent or derelict in their duties.  One means of ensuring that the gatekeepers are 
appropriately engaged (as one may define) in the next case is to incentivize such be-
havior by enacting a liability rule.  Id. at 1405 (“[T]he starting point for responding to 
the Enron debacle begins with asking the right question.  That question is not: Why 
did some managements engage in fraud?  But is rather: Why did the gatekeepers let 
them?”). 
14
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indeed remains a highly debated point in case law and scholarship,70 never-
theless an exploration of liability rules as a category of conflicts rules will 
further illuminate the discussion that surrounds such a difficult question.71 
Liability rules are, in their essential function, a method of compensating 
an aggrieved party for the damages caused by another.72  For instance, if you 
are a corporate executive and engage in securities fraud,73 presumably your 
malfeasance will damage your stockholders through a depressed stock price.74  
Accordingly, existing law makes such executives liable to their shareholders 
in a state derivative suit75 and federal securities class action.76  The instances 
in which such liability attaches are matters, therefore, that are further ad-
dressed in the relevant federal and state statutes and regulations,77 as well as 
under applicable decisional law.78  Thus, it is unsurprising to find that any 
possible changes to liability rules are points of contention that – in a manner 
similar to activity rules – will cause the political debate to be joined.79  In 
such cases, the interest group that may classify as an aggrieved party would 
  
 70. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
158 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 166-67 (1994); Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a Future 
After Stoneridge?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 351 (2009); Joseph Grundfest, Is There an Ex-
press Section 10(b) Private Right of Action?  A Response to Professor Prentice (Stan-
ford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 352, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077437; Robert A. Prentice, 
Scheme Liability: A Reply to Grundfest (McCombs Research Paper Series No. IROM-
03-07, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1030525; Joseph Grundfest, Scheme Liability: A Question for Congress, Not for 
the Court (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance Stanford Univ. Working Paper No. 
12, Stanford Univ. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 344, Stanford Univ. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 1005524, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1005524. 
 71. See infra Part III.A. 
 72. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 36, at 979-80. 
 73. See HAZEN, supra note 49,  §§ 12.3, 12.4 (describing remedies for fraud in 
the sale or trade of securities). 
 74. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (“The fraud on 
the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities 
market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material infor-
mation regarding the company and its business . . . . Misleading statements will there-
fore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the 
misstatements . . . . The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the 
plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of di-
rect reliance on misrepresentations.”) (citation omitted). 
 75. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Laws). 
 76. See HAZEN, supra note 49, §§ 7.17, 12.15. 
 77. See id. §1.2 (reviewing the history and scope of federal and state regula-
tions). 
 78. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
 79. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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more naturally be in favor of the liability rule, while the potential compensat-
ing party will be decidedly opposed to the rule because it will necessarily 
increase its cost of doing business.80  In this sense, liability rules present a 
struggle between two competing interest groups as to who should compensate 
for what and to whom.81 
An example of this extended contest that often surrounds liability rules 
is the longstanding debate regarding the availability of a private cause of ac-
tion for secondary liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.82 
As a matter of legal history, the current debate over secondary liability 
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act began in earnest in 1994 with the 
Court’s decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.83  Fur-
ther, the debate continued with the more recent 2008 decision of the Court 
regarding “scheme” liability in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta.84  Taken together, these cases provide the doctrinal context85 in 
which one may further explore liability rules as a category for conflicts rules 
in the area of corporate and securities law.86 
  
 80. In connection with such increased costs, the question of a possible increase 
in agency costs remains an important area of inquiry.  See, e.g., George M. Cohen, 
When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
273, 280 (1998) (“Law and economics scholars have used agency theory to analyze 
the client-lawyer relationship.  Examples of lawyer conduct that have been traced to 
agency cost problems include misusing client confidential information for the law-
yer’s personal gain, favoring one client’s interests over another’s, and increasing or 
skewing the demand for legal services in ways that benefit the lawyer but not the 
client.”).  But see Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
301, 301 (1998) (“Lawyers are more than their client’s agents.  Lawyers are officers 
of the court, thus subjecting themselves to the court’s supervision and to duties geared 
to protect the vigor, fairness, and integrity of processes of litigation.  Furthermore, as 
members of a profession, lawyers are subject to duties not neatly captured by the 
consequences of agency.”). 
 81. As a matter of practice, this would be more generally recognized as the 
somewhat unfortunate but all together common human behavior of pointing the finger 
at another.  See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Othello, in THE RIVERSIDE 
SHAKESPEARE 1251, 1279 (G. Blakemore Evans  
& J.J. M. Tobin eds., Houghton Mifflin Company 1997) (1622) (“[A]las, to make me 
[t]he fixed figure for the time of scorn [t]o point his slow [unmoving] finger at!”). 
 82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 83. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 84. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 85. Thus, while the particular facts of Central Bank and Stoneridge do not di-
rectly concern corporate gatekeepers as previously defined, nevertheless the doctrinal 
rules that result from such cases illustrate the nature and quality of liability rules in 
this context. 
 86. Although one could argue that Central Bank and Stoneridge are not cases 
that specifically or perhaps even necessarily implicate issues of conflicts of interest, 
this category of liability rules, as defined, seeks to facilitate discussion of not only 
conflicts of interest rules, in and of themselves, but also the principles of independ-
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1.  Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 
The facts in Central Bank concerned certain bonds issued by the Colo-
rado-Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority in the amount of $26 
million in order to “finance public improvements at Stetson Hills, a planned 
residential and commercial development in Colorado Springs.”87  Pursuant to 
the financing papers, Central Bank of Denver served as indenture trustee for 
the bonds in question, which were secured by certain real estate interests.88  
As part of the financing, AmWest, the developer of Stetson Hills, covenanted 
to provide an annual report that such real estate interests had value of at least 
160% of the outstanding principal and interest on the bonds.89  In light of a 
decline in real estate values, Central Bank performed an in-house appraisal of 
the real estate interests in question.90  The in-house appraisal determined that 
the stated values for such interests were “optimistic.”91  After exchanging 
letters with AmWest, Central Bank agreed to a delay of an independent re-
view of the real estate appraisal, which permitted a second tranche of the 
bond issues to close.92  In due time, however, the Colorado-Springs Stetson 
Hills Public Building Authority defaulted on this second tranche of bonds.93 
In such circumstances, the question before the Court was whether Cen-
tral Bank was “secondarily liable under [Section] 10(b) for its conduct in 
aiding and abetting the fraud.”94  In light of Central Bank’s role as indenture 
trustee, the issue of secondary liability became a critical point of concern.  In 
other words, Central Bank did not issue the bonds, but rather operated in a 
facilitating role per the terms of the indenture.95  Accordingly, a claim for a 
primary violation of section 10(b) by Central Bank would be difficult to sub-
  
ence that serve as the theoretical foundation for such rules.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2012).  Accordingly, by fashioning this category 
of liability rules, I seek to further explore the manner in which conflicts rules, broadly 
considered, may be addressed within the space of corporate and securities law. 
 87. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. at 167. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 167-68. 
 91. Id. at 167. 
 92. Id. at 168. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the 
Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (2008) (“Absent de-
fault, the indenture trustee’s duties to bondholders are straightforward and, indeed, 
even ministerial.  In the event of default, however, those duties are governed by a 
‘prudent man’ standard.”). 
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stantiate.96  But could investors in the bonds sue Central Bank on a theory of 
aiding and abetting liability? 
The Court responded in the negative in a 5-4 decision.97  In particular, 
the Court primarily relied upon the argument that Congressional intent was 
lacking in this instance.  Accordingly, the Court reasoned that “there would 
be no logical stopping point to this line of reasoning”98 of inferring private 
causes of action from the federal criminal statutory provision on aiding and 
abetting liability.  Both the public and scholarly reaction to Central Bank was 
mixed at best.99  Nevertheless, could an alternative theory of “scheme” liabil-
ity prevail where the aiding and abetting liability claimed in Central Bank had 
failed? 
2.  Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta 
In Stoneridge, investors in Charter Communications, Inc. filed suit 
against the company for falsely reporting financial information in order to 
meet Wall Street expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash 
flow.100  In particular, the investors alleged that Charter Communications 
engaged in transactions of no economic substance (i.e., sham transactions) in 
order to create the appearance of increased revenues.101  Indeed, the investors 
  
 96. As an elaboration, this would be so due to the fact that indenture trustees 
customarily do not actively engage in the marketing of bonds in a manner which 
would satisfy the requirement that such indenture trustee made a material misstate-
ment or omission in connection with the purchase and sale of the bonds.  See 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 97. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. at 185 (“In sum, it is not plausible to 
interpret the statutory silence as tantamount to an implicit congressional intent to 
impose [section] 10(b) aiding and abetting liability.”). 
 98. Id. at 190-91. 
 99. As part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress 
provided that the SEC may bring actions against persons on an aiding and abetting 
liability theory.  See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78t (2006).  However, this left unaddressed the possibility of a private right of ac-
tion by investors, which remains an issue within the scholarship.  See, e.g., Susan 
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1236, 1279 (2003) (“Aiding and abetting liability for lawyers must be re-
stored, and the level of scienter necessary for liability should be returned to reckless-
ness for private suits and for actions brought by the SEC.”); Roger C. Cramton, Enron 
and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 
182 (2002) (“The Central Bank case should be overruled by legislative action.”). 
 100. 552 U.S. 148, 152-53 (2008). 
 101. Id. at 154 (“The transactions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, 
because Charter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalize 
its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally accepted accounting princi-
 
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/3
File: HinesPaginated.docx Created on: 10/21/13 9:21 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:10 PM 
2013] THE CORPORATE GATEKEEPER 95 
alleged that Scientific-America and Motorola, each of whom were counter-
parties to contracts with Charter Communications, actively engaged in these 
sham transactions.102  For instance, the investors alleged that Scientific-
America falsely indicated an increase in its production costs,103 while both 
Scientific-America and Motorola backdated certain advertising agreements in 
order to hide from the company’s auditor that these transactions had no eco-
nomic value.104 
Unlike the facts in Central Bank, therefore, the plaintiffs in Stoneridge 
appeared to have a stronger case against the secondary actors – in this case, 
the counterparties to contract, Scientific-America and Motorola.105  However, 
the problem for the investors was that neither Scientific-America nor Mo-
torola had misstated the financial information of Charter Communications.106  
The question, therefore, was whether the investors could impose “scheme 
liability” on Scientific-America and Motorola in the absence of either com-
pany making specific disclosure in respect of the relevant transactions.107  
Once again, the Court responded in the negative.108  In particular, the Court 
held that the reliance requirement for a section 10(b) action was not satisfied 
because “it was Charter, not [Scientific-America and Motorola], that misled 
its auditor and filed fraudulent financial statements; nothing [Scientific-
America and Motorola] did made it necessary or inevitable for Charter to 
record the transactions as it did.”109 
When considered together, the Court’s rulings in Central Bank and 
Stoneridge illustrate how difficult it is to define – or, once again, to redefine – 
the liability that attaches to secondary actors to the corporation.110  And while 
both Central Bank and Stoneridge involved entities that are not typically con-
sidered within the definition of the corporate gatekeeper, the liability rules set 
forth in each of these cases apply to each of the corporate attorney, auditor, 
securities analyst, and ratings agency.111  Therefore, it appears that liability 
rules are quite similar to activity rules in that they are rules enacted, in some 
  
ples, the transactions would enable Charter to fool its auditor into approving a finan-
cial statement showing it met projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers.”). 
 102. Id. at 154-55. 
 103. Id. at 154. 
 104. Id. at 154-55. 
 105. See id. at 168-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 155 (majority opinion). 
 107. Id. at 159-160. 
 108. Id. at 159-161. 
 109. Id. at 161. 
 110. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 112 (1962) 
(“The expected costs of organizing decisions, under any given rule, will be less in the 
smaller unit than in the larger, assuming that the populations of each are roughly 
comparable.”); POSNER, supra note 44, § 19.3. 
 111. See supra note 85. 
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sense, in a moment of political violence.112  One side will prevail, and the 
other side will fail.113  And to the winner go the spoils – that is, the damages 
mandated by the new liability rule that will compensate for the alleged 
wrongs.114  In such circumstances, the possibility of enacting new activity 
rules and/or liability rules without the necessary political will appears remote 
at best.115  Other categories of conflicts rules must therefore be discussed. 
C.  Disclosure Rules 
The third category of legal rules on conflicts of interest in the context of 
corporate and securities law is the category of disclosure rules.116  For pur-
poses of this discussion, I will broadly define disclosure rules as those legal 
rules concerning the registration and reporting process for publicly traded 
companies under federal securities law and regulation.117  Disclosure rules, 
therefore, are legal rules that are best captured in the famous remarks of Jus-
tice Brandeis: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and in-
dustrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light 
the most efficient policeman.”118  As a matter of legal history, such an ap-
proach to securities regulation was the hallmark of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s thinking toward federal legislation in respect of such business 
activities.119  Accordingly, in discussing disclosure rules, we concern our-
  
 112. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122721278056345271.html (“‘You never want 
a serious crisis to go to waste,’ Rahm Emanuel, Mr. Obama’s new chief of staff, told 
a Wall Street Journal conference of top corporate chief executives this week.”). 
 113. Anglo-American legal history provides the antecedents for such an approach 
to dispute resolution.  See, e.g., DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL HERITAGE: INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS 159 (2nd ed. 2004) (“‘Battle’ was the 
original mode of proof for the writ of right.  It also fell from favor after the Fourth 
Lateran Council (1215).  Battle, like oaths, technically survived into the 19th century.  
Indeed, it was only abolished in 1819 by statute after a party tried to use it to bring an 
appeal of felony in the case of Ashford v. Thornton (1818), 1 B. & Ald. 405.”). 
 114. See Macey & Miller, supra note 36, at 979. 
 115. See supra notes 44, 78 and accompanying text. 
 116. For purposes of this Article, I do not address matters of state securities or 
“blue sky” laws.  See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 49, § 8.1 (“Section 18(b) of the 1933 
Act, as enacted by the [National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996], pro-
vides that a number of securities offerings will be exempted from state law regulation 
in terms of registration and reporting requirements.  Notwithstanding the curtailing of 
state law regulatory jurisdiction, state antifraud provisions are preserved.”). 
 117. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78pp (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.1016 (2012).  
 118. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE 
IT 92 (1914) [hereinafter BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY]. 
 119. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 41 
(3rd ed. 2003) (“[President Franklin D. Roosevelt] approached the problem of securi-
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selves with foundational rules of the federal securities regulatory regime.120  
Moreover, while in recent years federal securities law and regulation may 
have encroached into the historical role of states in respect of corporate gov-
ernance,121 the fact remains that the federal securities regulatory system is 
primarily a system that mandates and enforces disclosure rules.122 
As noted previously, the distinction between disclosure rules and liabil-
ity rules has a tendency to blur in practice.123  For purposes of this categoriza-
tion, however, this distinction will be preserved in order to facilitate consid-
eration of these different species of legal rules.124  For instance, suppose that 
Corporation X discloses in its proxy statement that CEO Y will receive $50 
million in aggregate compensation.125  Suppose further that, in point of fact, 
CEO Y will receive $50 million and one cent in aggregate compensation.126  
In each case, the amount of aggregate compensation must be disclosed pursu-
ant to a disclosure rule, as defined previously.127  But is the difference in dis-
closed compensation – that is, the lonely cent that did not make it into the 
final draft for the printers – a matter that will also trigger a liability rule?128  
One thinks not, because the misstatement of one cent will probably not con-
  
ties regulation with the instincts of a progressive politician in the Wilson and Brandeis 
tradition, rather than of an economist concerned with the larger questions of capital 
allocation and economic recovery.  Rarely did Roosevelt speak about the stock market 
without invoking the title of Louis Brandeis’s celebrated study, Other People’s 
Money.  Like Brandeis, Roosevelt viewed the need to reform securities sales practices 
primarily as stemming from the self-interest of investment bankers, primarily the 
House of Morgan.  Like Brandeis, Roosevelt believed the moral delicts of the bankers 
would be curbed when fully exposed to public scrutiny.”). 
 120. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Jan. 24, 
2013) (“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States 
derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institu-
tions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an invest-
ment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it.  To achieve this, the SEC requires 
public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the pub-
lic.”). 
 121. See HAZEN, supra note 49, § 22.1 (giving an overview of the intersection of 
many state and federal securities regulation laws). 
 122. See The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 120. 
 123. See supra note 32. 
 124. But see Kennedy, supra note 33, at 210 (discussing the act of categorizing 
legal rules as a method of inquiry). 
 125. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2012). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
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stitute a material misstatement of executive compensation for purposes of 
section 10(b) liability.129 
Thus, while disclosure rules and liability rules are undoubtedly con-
nected – indeed, they may be seen as two sides of the same coin under federal 
securities law and regulation – the difference in their fundamental nature re-
mains.130  Disclosure rules mandate disclosure.  Liability rules mandate liabil-
ity.131  And, therefore, disclosure rules, in and of themselves, should be fur-
ther explored as part of this categorization.  In particular, the proxy disclosure 
of codes of ethics for senior financial officers132 as well as the proposed dis-
closure rules for compensation committee independence standards133 provide 
us with examples of disclosure rules in practice.134 
1.  Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers 
The first example of a disclosure rule, for purposes of this discussion,135 
is the requirement that companies subject to Regulation S-K must disclose 
their ethical codes.136  Specifically, section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley mandated 
that the SEC issue rules to “require each issuer . . . to disclose whether or not, 
  
 129. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5; SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (Aug. 
12, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (2011)). 
 130. See supra note 32.  A more recent example of the interconnection of disclo-
sure rules and liability rules is the historic $550 million settlement between the SEC 
and Goldman Sachs in relation to certain trading in subprime mortgage collateralized 
debt obligations (“CDOs”).  See Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 
SEC Litigation Release No. 21595, No. Civ. 3229 (Jul. 15, 2010).  In particular, 
Goldman Sachs acknowledged that marketing materials for a certain CDO transaction 
“contained incomplete information” in that it failed to disclose that Paulson & Co., 
Inc., a noted hedge fund, engaged in the selection process for the referenced portfolio.  
See id. 
 131. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 1, at 40 n.37. 
 132. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66).   
 133. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5301-5641). 
 134. Although there are numerous examples of disclosure rules under federal 
securities law and regulation, I have selected the proxy disclosure related to codes of 
ethics for senior financial officers and the newly enacted compensation committee 
independence standards in that they provide us with useful examples of the intersec-
tion of corporate law with legal ethics.  See supra note 13. 
 135. Again while this particular disclosure rule does not read to the corporate 
gatekeeper but to her client – here, the senior financial officers – nevertheless the 
illustration of this disclosure rule provides context for purposes of this categorization.  
See supra note 85. 
 136. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2012). 
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and if not, the reason therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of ethics for 
senior financial officers, applicable to its principal financial officer and 
comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing similar 
functions”.137  
In response to this Congressional mandate, the SEC promulgated Item 
406 of Regulation S-K that requires, inter alia, the disclosure of such a code 
of ethics.138  Further, the SEC defined the term “code of ethics” as meaning: 
[W]ritten standards that are reasonably designed to deter wrongdo-
ing and to promote: (1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the 
ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between 
personal and professional relationships; (2) Full, fair, accurate, 
timely, and understandable disclosure in reports and documents 
that a registrant files with, or submits to, the Commission and in 
other public communications made by the registrant; (3) Compli-
ance with applicable governmental law, rules and regulations; (4) 
The prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an ap-
propriate person or persons identified in the code; and (5) Ac-
countability for adherence to the code.139 
Here, therefore, is an example of the intersection of corporate law with 
legal ethics in the form of a disclosure rule.140  More specifically, Item 406 
provides for the disclosure of a code of ethics that addresses the issue of con-
flicts of interest.141 
But what information in respect of conflicts of interest is being disclosed 
by registrants pursuant to this disclosure rule?142  And further to such consid-
  
 137. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406(a). 
 138. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(a) (2012). 
 139. See id. § 229.406(b) (emphasis added). 
 140. For purposes of this Article, however, I use the term “corporate law” in a 
wider sense to include matters that are more specifically addressed in federal securi-
ties law and regulation.  While the interrelation of state corporation law and federal 
securities law remains an important area of inquiry in the scholarship, such matters 
are without the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE 
LAW § 1.2, at 8 (2d ed. 2009) (“Indeed, publicly held corporations can be said to func-
tion in a dual regulatory scheme: federal securities law and state corporate law.”).  As 
for a possible definition of legal ethics, I will adopt a wider meaning as well.  See, 
e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 3 (2004) [hereinafter HAZARD & DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS] (“‘Legal Ethics’ in-
cludes not only ethical conventions of the legal profession but also legal regulations 
prescribed by the authority of the state.”). 
 141. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b). 
 142. See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in 
Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“[A]t least for related-
party transactions, firms regularly engage in a kind of ‘disclosure arbitrage,’ neglect-
ing to disclose ethics waivers at the time when transactions occur (in violation of 
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erations, are there other disclosure rules that we might consider as examples 
of the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics? 
2.  Compensation Committee Independence Standards 
A second example of a disclosure rule that lies at the intersection of cor-
porate law and legal ethics is the newly enacted independence standards for 
compensation committees and related proxy disclosure to such standards.143  
In particular, section 952 of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to issue by rule, or 
direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to 
promulgate such rules, whereby certain independence standards will apply for 
compensation committees.144  Further, section 952 requires the SEC to define 
by rule certain factors that may affect the “independence”145 of the relevant 
compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser to a compensation 
committee of an issuer: 
(A) the provision of other services to the issuer by the person that 
employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other ad-
viser; (B) the amount of fees received from the issuer by the person 
that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other 
adviser . . . ; (C) the policies and procedures of the person that em-
ploys the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser 
that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest; (D) any business 
or personal relationship of the compensation consultant, legal 
counsel, or other adviser with a member of the compensation 
committee; and (E) any stock of the issuer owned by the compen-
sation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser.146 
Here, once again, we find a legal rule that touches upon both corporate 
law and legal ethics in its requirement that conflicts of interest policies and 
procedures must preserve the independence of the compensation consultant, 
legal counsel, or other adviser.147  
  
Section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley), but disclosing related-party transactions in their 
year-end proxy statements as required by Item 404 of Regulation S-K.”). 
 143. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5301-5641). 
 144. See id. § 952(a). 
 145. See generally Christopher T. Hines, Tatsuya Tanigawa & Andrew P. Hughes, 
Doing Deals in Japan: An Analysis of Recent Trends and Developments for the U.S. 
Practitioner, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 355, 413 n.144 (2006). 
 146. Dodd-Frank Act § 952(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. 
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While this independence rule is not a disclosure rule as such,148 section 
952 of Dodd-Frank later provides for the disclosure in corporate proxy mate-
rials of whether:  
(A) the compensation committee of the issuer retained or obtained 
the advice of a compensation consultant; and (B) the work of the 
compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest and, if 
so, the nature of the conflict and how the conflict is being ad-
dressed.149 
Here, therefore, is an additional disclosure rule that implicates matters of 
both corporate law and legal ethics. 
In addition, the SEC has issued a final rule pursuant to the mandates of 
section 952.150  However, since the relevant disclosure in proxy statements 
pursuant to such rule is currently unavailable, as of present it is not com-
pletely clear what specific information will be provided by means of this new 
disclosure rule.151  Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present categorization, 
the definition of disclosure rules becomes clearer. 
D.  Ethical Rules 
The fourth and final category of legal rules in the area of corporate and 
securities law is ethical rules.152  In many ways, this last category of ethical 
  
 148. Indeed, the independence rule would more properly be considered as a cor-
porate governance rule.  See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 140, § 5.7(B). 
 149. Dodd-Frank Act § 952(c). 
 150. Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,422 (June 
27, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240). 
 151. Comments to the SEC proposed rule identified a number of points that re-
quired additional consideration.  See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair of the 
Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, to U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 12 (Jun. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-
11/s71311-57.pdf (“We do not believe that it is appropriate for the Commission to 
expand the Section 10C(c)(2) disclosure requirement to cover both actual and poten-
tial conflicts of interest.”); Letter from Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Assoc. Professor, Co-
lumbia Law Sch., to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (May 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-52.pdf (“While the exact design of 
the disclosure is beyond the scope of these preliminary comments, companies should 
at least be required to disclose which attorneys advised the compensation committee 
on executive pay – and any potential conflict of interest these lawyers may face.”). 
 152. Although this category of ethical rules undoubtedly and perhaps even neces-
sarily touches upon the prior categories of activity rules, liability rules, and disclosure 
rules, I believe that there is merit in distinguishing ethical rules from these other cate-
gories for reasons that will be made clear.  See infra Part III.A. 
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rules presents the greatest challenge as a matter of taxonomy.153  What is an 
ethical rule under law?154  Is it necessarily a moral rule, and if so, what then 
are the connections (if any) between law, ethics and morality?155  Further, 
what of the notion of professionalism or professional ethics as such terms are 
commonly used in scholarship?156  What then do we mean to say when em-
ploying such language in scholarly discourse, or perhaps more tellingly what 
do we not mean?157 
As a means of facilitating further discussion on such points, this Article 
seeks to adopt a more neutral phraseology in relation to these fundamental 
questions.158  Thus, I employ the term ethical rule as a conscious effort to 
  
 153. Indeed, the definition of one’s “ethics” may be viewed as the normative act 
itself.  For once certain behavior or other relevant thought or action becomes by defi-
nition unethical, then by necessity it will not be ethical.  In this sense, the categoriza-
tion of ethics brings substance to the form.  See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33, at 210 
(discussing the act of categorizing legal rules as a method of inquiry). 
 154. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
448, 453 (1995) (“By ‘ethics,’ I mean norms shared by a group on a basis of mutual 
and usually reciprocal recognition.  Ethics, as thus defined, is essentially a two-party 
transaction . . . . The term ‘ethics’ comes to us from the Greek ethikos, a word which 
signified a custom or usage.  Thus, the term refers to a norm having the characteristic 
of being understood in a community . . . . [E]thics entails a dimension of outward 
manifestation resulting in communication within the relevant community and a di-
mension of historical sequence through which an idea manifested at one period is 
remembered at a subsequent period.”). 
 155. In answering such a question, of course, lies the fundamental distinction 
between natural law and legal positivist approaches to law.  See, e.g., ROBERT L. 
HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 1-10, 74-80 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 156. See, e.g., COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR. ASS’N, “. . . IN THE SPIRIT 
OF PUBLIC SERVICE”: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER 
PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986) (“‘Professionalism’ is an elastic concept the meaning 
and application of which are hard to pin down.  That is perhaps as it should be.  The 
term has a rich, long-standing heritage, and any single definition runs the risk of being 
too confining.”);  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and Professional Ethics, 
40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 134 (1992) (“The term ‘professional ethics’ can be under-
stood to refer to at least three different but related normative sources: first, the profes-
sion’s rules of ethics; second, ethical tradition including professional myths, lore and 
narrative; and, third, the standards of conduct that an observing anthropologist would 
describe as the profession’s conventions of actual practice.  The last source may also 
be captured by the term ‘habit’ which at one time was used to describe a group’s 
regular pattern of conduct.”). 
 157. See supra note 156.  Definition is, therefore, a decision – that is to say, a 
decision as to the precise ambit of the ethics under consideration.  This said, the inter-
pretation of such definitions is a matter beyond the scope of inquiry in this article. 
 158. Without doubt, alternative terms may be used by those with a contrary per-
spective to the conclusions that I draw in this Article.  Nevertheless, the intention is to 
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provide common language that may be utilized when forming arguments 
from numerous perspectives on law.159  Further, I make the initial distinction 
between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical rules.160  In this 
respect, the intention is once again to provide such language that may be use-
ful in furthering scholarly discussion on such points.161  But before turning to 
the distinction between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical rules, 
it is helpful to more fully enunciate the meaning of the term ethical rule as 
used for the purposes of the present discussion. 
The more frequently used phrase in modern discourse is the word pro-
fessionalism or professional ethics.162  But what does this phrase mean?  As 
Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Deborah Rhode explain, “‘Profession’ comes 
from the Latin, professionem, meaning to make a public declaration.  The 
term evolved to describe occupations that required new entrants to take an 
oath professing their dedication to the ideals and practices associated with a 
learned calling.”163  While the origins of the term profession may be clear, 
however, the manner in such it is employed has not been entirely consistent 
over time.164  Nevertheless, a consistency in the usage of the term profes-
sional or its variants (i.e., professionalism, professional ethics) is, in some 
fashion, an effort to achieve greater virtue on the part of the profession in 
question.165 
  
make the language employed as neutral as may be possible, given the inherent limita-
tions of the written word.  Accordingly, one may view this taxonomy as placeholders 
of sorts for the concepts that are being explored in developing the lines of argumenta-
tion as set forth herein.  See, e.g., WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, 
LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD vii 
(1972) (“[E]very legal problem – whether it concern the ‘great issues’ of civil disobe-
dience or the hum-drum matters of Offer and Acceptance and Last Clear Chance – 
has its roots and perhaps its analog in traditionally ‘philosophical’ realms.  Strip away 
the technical terms, plumb the debate’s assumptions, and a host of implicit philoso-
phical positions will be found.”). 
 159. See id. at 403. 
 160. See infra Parts II.D.1-2. 
 161. Without some measure of agreement as to the language being employed, one 
imagines that further discussion as to areas of disagreement cannot be fully explored.  
We must, therefore, first agree on the language being used prior to any disagreement 
as to subsequent argumentation.  See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., Hazard, Doing the Right Thing, supra note 11, at 691 (“In the most 
recent decade, the call [to ‘do the right thing’] has been expressed in terms of ‘profes-
sionalism.’  In earlier years, the call was expressed as a demand that lawyers dedicate 
themselves to ‘serving the public interest’ and in Victorian times it was expressed in 
terms of the ‘honor of the legal profession.’”). 
 163. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 2 (3d ed. 1994). 
 164. See Hazard, Doing the Right Thing, supra note 11, at 691-92. 
 165. See id. at 691 (“[T]he quest is for greater virtue on the part of lawyers, both 
individually and as a member of the profession.”); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and 
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Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of “profession” is found in 
Professor Wasserstrom’s influential article on the subject matter.166  Given its 
importance within the scholarship, it may be helpful to quote at length: 
Because of the significance for my analysis of the closely related 
concepts of a profession and professional, it will be helpful to indi-
cate at the outset what I take to be the central features of a profes-
sion. . . .   
. . .There are, I think, at least six that are worth noting.   
(1) The professions require a substantial period of formal education 
– at least as much if not more than that required by any other occu-
pation. . . .   
(2) The professions require the comprehension of a substantial 
amount of theoretical knowledge and the utilization of a substantial 
amount of intellectual ability . . . .   
(3) The professions are both an economic monopoly and largely 
self-regulating.  Not only is the practice of the profession restricted 
to those who are certified as possessing the requisite competencies, 
but the questions of what competencies are required and who pos-
sesses them are questions that are left to the members of the pro-
fession to decide for themselves. . . .   
(4) The professions are clearly among the occupations that possess 
the greatest social prestige in the society.  They also typically pro-
vide a degree of material affluence substantially greater than that 
enjoyed by most working persons. . . .   
(5) The professions are almost always involved with matters which 
from time to time are among the greatest personal concerns that 
humans have: physical health, psychic well-being, liberty, and the 
like.  As a result, persons who seek the services of a professional 
  
Virtues:  Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 
940 (1996) (arguing that “highly technocratic lawyers” cannot be good ethical delib-
erators). 
 166. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 
HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).  But see Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There 
Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 131 (2001) (“The 
questions articulated by Wasserstrom and accepted by so many legal scholars as cen-
tral to legal ethics do not fit the patterns of later lawyer scandals any better than they 
fit Watergate.”). 
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are often in a state of appreciable concern, if not vulnerability, 
when they do so. . . .   
(6) The professions almost always involve at their core a signifi-
cant inter-personal relationship between the professional, on the 
one hand, and the person who is thought to require the profes-
sional’s services: the patient or the client.167 
Professions, therefore, are an elite of sorts within society with certain 
prescribed privileges and responsibilities that are obtained upon the comple-
tion of rigorous academic training and achievement.168  As Tocqueville fa-
mously observed: “Hidden at the bottom of the souls of lawyers one therefore 
finds a part of the tastes and habits of aristocracy.  They have its instinctive 
penchant for order, its natural love of forms; they conceive its great disgust 
for the actions of the multitude and secretly scorn the government of the peo-
ple.”169 
This notion of the professional as a class that is separate and distinct 
from others in society is a reality that is often at odds with fundamental prin-
ciples of American culture.170  Such tension between the necessity for profes-
  
 167. Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1-2 n.1 (emphasis added). 
 168. See id. 
 169. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 252 (Harvey C. Mans-
field & Delba Winthrop eds., University of Chicago Press 2000) (1835).  Although 
this quotation from Tocqueville is often cited, its precise meaning is frequently lost or 
misunderstood.  See, e.g., Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 1272 
(“It is important to contrast Tocqueville’s view of aristocracy with what seems to be a 
widely shared contemporary misinterpretation of that concept.  In present-day Ameri-
can usage, ‘aristocracy’ signifies a class constituted by inheritance, endowed with 
unearned wealth and income, and privileged to remain in idleness.  Its members enjoy 
their status by an accident of history and interject themselves in serious matters only 
occasionally and then merely as a matter of personal choice.  This concept of an aris-
tocracy calls up images of the English country house dilettantes of the Victorian era . . 
. . Yet Tocqueville assumes that an ‘aristocratic element’ must exist even in a democ-
racy, and finds it in the legal profession and in ‘those who have turned to industry.’  
In Jeffersonian terms – perhaps compatible with democratic ideology – members of 
the legal profession would be a ‘natural aristocracy,’ as distinct from an inherited 
one.”). 
 170. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order 
to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide 
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.”); Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 
1241 (“The bar’s ambiguous standards of competence, for example, can be attributed 
to such external realities as the wide variety of constituencies seeking legal services, 
the diversity of aspirants for legal careers, and – above all – fundamental tendencies 
in the American social environment: its unacknowledged social stratification, disdain 
for elitism, and aversion to regulatory controls on personal behavior.”). 
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sions within the greater political economy and the tendencies of an anti-
establishment culture often leads to the most natural of results – profession-
als, and lawyers in particular, are not exceedingly popular in the United 
States.171  But such cultural phenomena aside, the reality remains that the task 
must be completed – and, therefore, the professions must seek to complete 
their appointed task.172 
One of the most important tasks of professions is their self-regulation.173  
While reasonable minds may disagree as to whether such an approach is natu-
ral or whether alternatives may be desired,174 this is the current state of affairs 
  
 171. See, e.g., Hazard, Doing the Right Thing, supra note 11, at 701 (“I submit 
that the opprobrium is essentially what psychiatrists call ‘projection.’ . . . The law-
yer’s vocation is living testimony to the discrepancy between the community’s ethical 
aspirations and its merely human condition.  It may also be that the availability of 
lawyers to deal with some of these discrepancies permits other members of the com-
munity to imagine themselves above such unpleasantness and allows them to live in 
an imaginary world.”); Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflec-
tions in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 380 (1987) (“Lawyers, it seems, can’t 
win for trying.  They are simultaneously praised and blamed for the very same ac-
tions.”).  This said, the interrelationship of the professions with greater society need 
not always be this strained.  For instance, in Japan the notion that there is a legal elite 
is an accepted reality for the larger society in question.  See generally Curtis J. Mil-
haupt & Mark D. West, Law’s Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in Japan, 34 
L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 451, 459-477 (2003).  But what one culture may accept, an-
other may freely deny as a matter of choice or, more likely, historical path depend-
ence.  And therein lies the difference for the professions when properly considering 
their ethical rules within the fabric of larger social discourse.  Or, to put the question 
plainly, to which culture are you fashioning the ethical rule?  See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE 
CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 38 (Henry 
Hardy ed., 1990) (“In order to understand a culture, one must employ the same facul-
ties of sympathetic insight with which we understand one another, without which 
there is neither love nor friendship, nor true human relationships.”); HAZARD & 
DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 140, at 2 (“Every legal system has a distinct cul-
tural character, and there is much variance in legal systems even among the Western 
regimes.”). 
 172. See Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1-2 n.1.  Here, Professor Wasserstrom’s 
observations ring true that “[t]he professions are almost always involved with matters 
which from time to time are among the greatest personal concerns that humans have: 
physical health, psychic well-being, liberty, and the like.”  Id.  Some measure of op-
probrium is, one must imagine, a small price to pay in the face of such important 
responsibilities.  See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of 
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071-72 (1976) (“To be sure, the 
lawyer’s range of concern is sharply limited.  But within that limited domain the in-
tensity of identification with the client’s interests is the same.”). 
 173. See Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1 n.1. 
 174. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the 
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1316 (2003) [hereinafter Coffee, The Attorney as 
Gatekeeper] (“The blunt truth is that private self-regulation of attorneys through bar 
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of the professions.175  This Article, therefore, addresses the professions in 
their current state and not necessarily in their desired form.176  More specifi-
cally, this Article considers the professional qua gatekeeper177 in a manner 
consistent with the ongoing scholarship on corporate gatekeepers.178  In tak-
ing such an approach, the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics will 
be further explored.179  And as a means to further such lines of inquiry, the 
initial distinction between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical 
rules becomes necessary.180 
1.  First-Order Ethical Rules 
A first-order ethical rule is, for purposes of this discussion, a rule of eth-
ics as may be prescribed by the relevant profession.181  Accordingly, the first-
  
associations means the continued government of the guild, by the guild, and for the 
guild.”). 
 175. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Respon-
sibilities ¶ 10 (2012) (“The legal profession is largely self-governing.  Although other 
professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is 
unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the 
processes of government and law enforcement.  This connection is manifested in the 
fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.”). 
 176. This said, I do not intend to provide a purely descriptive argument, but also 
include some possible prescriptions in federal securities law and regulation.  See infra 
Part III.A.2. 
 177. See Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 21 (“The lawyer qua professional is, of 
necessity, only centrally interested in that part of the client that lies within his or her 
special competency.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); see generally COFFEE, supra 
note 14. 
 179. See supra note 13. 
 180. See infra Parts II.D.1-2.  Notably, this distinction between first-order ethical 
rules and second-order ethical rules should not be confused with the distinction of 
primary and secondary rules.  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 
1994) (“Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type confer powers, 
public or private.”). 
 181. In using the phrase first-order ethical rule, I do not mean to suggest that such 
rules are necessarily more important or in some fashion superior to what will later be 
described as a second-order ethical rule.  The effort, once again, is to provide a tax-
onomy of ethical rules that will facilitate further discussion.  Indeed, the distinction 
between a first-order ethical rule and second-order ethical should be considered as 
primarily one of logic.  See Herbert B. Enderton, Second-Order and Higher-Order 
Logic, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (MAR. 4, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries 
/logic-higher-order/ (“Second-order logic is an extension of first-order logic where, in 
addition to quantifiers such as ‘for every object (in the universe of discourse),’ one 
has quantifiers such as ‘for every property of objects (in the universe of discourse).’  
This augmentation of the language increases its expressive strength, without adding 
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order ethical rule is an ethical rule of the first-order precisely because it is 
enunciated by the relevant profession as matter of self-regulation.182  Again, 
while reasonable minds may disagree as to whether first-order ethical rules 
should be promulgated in the current fashion or whether alternatives may be 
desirable,183 nevertheless the reality remains that first-order ethical rules do 
exist for the professional qua gatekeeper.184  More specifically, the first-order 
ethical rules for corporate attorneys are those model rules of legal ethics as 
drafted by the American Bar Association (“ABA”),185 and as further enunci-
ated and enforced by the bar associations and courts in the various states.186  
Therefore, the ABA rules on the ethics of the legal profession and the histori-
cal development thereof are the focus of this discussion.187 
As a matter of legal history, it may be helpful to first recall the precise 
manner in which the self-regulation of attorneys commenced in the United 
States.188  Although the antecedents of the professional regulation of attor-
neys read back to the nineteenth century in the United States,189 and even as 
far back as the thirteenth century in England,190 the first comprehensive ethi-
  
new non-logical symbols, such as new predicate symbols.  For classical extensional 
logic (as in this entry), properties can be identified with sets, so that second-order 
logic provides us with the quantifier ‘for every set of objects.’”). 
 182. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibili-
ties ¶ 10 (2012); Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1-2 n.1. 
 183. See, e.g., Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 174, at 1316. 
 184. See MODEL RULES Scope ¶ 19 (“Failure to comply with an obligation or 
prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”). 
 185. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7-1.13; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
Canons 5, 9 (1981).  
 186. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 8-9 (2d ed. 2007). 
 187. See generally CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASSOC., A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005 143-318 (2006). 
 188. See COFFEE, supra note 14, at 199-202 (detailing the historical evolution of 
the modern MODEL RULES). 
 189. See Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the 
Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 471 (1998) (“[T]he Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
owe much of their content to the first code of ethics for lawyers officially adopted in 
the United States: the 1887 code of ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association.”).  In 
this effort at codification, the prior work of George Sharswood and David Hoffman 
were particularly influential.  See id. at 493-97. 
 190. See, e.g., Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A His-
tory of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (“In the late thirteenth century, 
three critical regulations were adopted: the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29 
(1275), the London Ordinance of 1280, and the Ordinance of 1292, de Attornatis et 
Apprenticiis.”). 
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/3
File: HinesPaginated.docx Created on: 10/21/13 9:21 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:10 PM 
2013] THE CORPORATE GATEKEEPER 109 
cal “code”191 for attorneys in the United States took the form of the ABA 
Canons of Professional Ethics.192  The impetus for such codification of ethical 
rules came from a speech by President Theodore Roosevelt given in 1905, 
where he made the following observation: 
Every man of great wealth who runs his business with cynical con-
tempt for those prohibitions of the law which by hired cunning he 
can escape or evade is a menace to our community; and the com-
munity is not to be excused if it does not develop a spirit which ac-
tively frowns on and discountenances him.  The great profession of 
the law should be that profession whose members ought to take the 
lead in the creation of just such a spirit.  We all know that, as 
things actually are, many of the most influential and most highly 
remunerated members of the bar in every centre of wealth make it 
their special task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by which 
their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the 
laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use 
of great wealth.193 
In response to this call for action, the ABA adopted the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics in 1908.194  In comparison to the current rules of professional 
ethics the Canons of Professional Ethics are somewhat antiquated.195  The 
adoption of these Canons meant the Rubicon had been crossed; there now 
  
 191. See generally UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, 
SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW 384 (7th ed. 2009) (discussing the historical 
evolution of legal codification). 
 192. See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (1908). 
 193. Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, Address at Harvard University (June 28, 
1905), available at http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/txtspeeches 
/143.txt (emphasis added).  In addition to his comments on the legal profession, 
President Roosevelt also championed the cause of scholarship in this address.  See id. 
(“The ideal for the graduate school and for those undergraduates who are to go into it 
must be the ideal of high scholarly production, which is to be distinguished in the 
sharpest fashion from the mere transmittal of ready-made knowledge without adding 
to it.  If America is to contribute its full share to the progress not alone of knowledge, 
but of wisdom, then we must put ever-increasing emphasis on university work done 
along the lines of the graduate school.”). 
 194. See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS. 
 195. See id. Preamble (“The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends 
upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied.  It cannot be so maintained un-
less the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit 
the approval of all just men.”); see also Luban & Millemann, supra note 28, at 45 
(“The term ‘canon’ derives initially from biblical studies, where ‘the canon’ referred 
to those sacred texts officially included in the Bible (the antonym was ‘apocry-
pha’).”). 
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existed a formal ethical code for attorneys in the United States.196  Despite the 
fact that the specific rule on conflicts of interest was rather terse,197 it did 
provide the beginnings for the further development of first-order ethical rules 
in the form of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.198 
a.  Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
In 1969, the ABA enacted the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, which constituted a significant revision – indeed, perhaps one can even 
say a redrafting – of the first-order ethical rules for attorneys in the United 
States.199  Notably, the Model Code reorganized the rules in question into a 
three-fold structure: canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules.200  
The canons continued to provide general direction to attorneys,201 while the 
ethical considerations provided aspirational rules.202  Further, the disciplinary 
rules203 provided the first step in what Professor Hazard calls the “legaliza-
tion” process of the norms of professional conduct.204  Accordingly, while the 
Model Code may be viewed as an intermediate step between the 1908 Canons 
and the Model Rules, on closer inspection the Model Code provided a clear 
break from the past in that first-order rules for attorneys now took the form, at 
least in part, of what is now frequently known as professional regulation.205 
Nevertheless, the Model Code did maintain some elements of the 1908 
Canons through the vehicle of the canons and, more specifically, the ethical 
  
 196. See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS. 
 197. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 6 (“It is unprofessional to represent 
conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full 
disclosure of the facts.”). 
 198. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.13 (2012); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canons 5, 9 (1981). 
 199. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. (“The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in gen-
eral terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relation-
ships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.”). 
 202. See id. (“The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and repre-
sent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive.”). 
 203. See id. (“The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are man-
datory in character.  The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct be-
low which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.”). 
 204. See Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 1251 (“In retro-
spect, it is clear that the crucial step in the ‘legalization’ process occurred in the 
change from the 1908 Canons to the 1970 code, rather than from the Code to the 1983 
Rules.”). 
 205. See id. (“The Code’s Disciplinary Rules formed the baseline of the 1983 
Rules; indeed, many of the DR’s were carried over intact into the Rules.”). 
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considerations.206  And the reasons for this division between the aspirational 
and the mandatory, as Professor David Luban explains in his important work 
on the subject matter,207 was in part due to the scholarship of Professor Lon 
Fuller.208  In this sense, therefore, the ethical considerations provide a means 
by which one may explore the “inner morality” of a profession that an other-
wise mandatory rule may not achieve.209  Accordingly, the Model Code pre-
sents us with this bifurcated approach to first-order ethical rules – those that 
are aspirational, and those that are mandatory.210 
Of particular note for the present discussion on conflicts of interest, the 
Model Code provides, under the rubric of an Ethical Consideration, a rule on 
the appearance of impropriety, which may be helpful to consider at length: 
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor 
of his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the 
courts and the judges thereof; to observe the Code of Professional 
Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned profession, one 
dedicated to public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers 
in supporting the organized bar through the devoting of his time, 
efforts, and financial support as his professional standing and abil-
ity reasonably permit; to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on 
the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust 
  
 206. See MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement. 
 207. See David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 801 (1998). 
 208. See id. at 806-07 (“Fuller was not only an important philosopher of legal 
ethics, he was also, for a period of time, quite an influential one . . . . [T]he Model 
Code divided its rules into aspirational ‘Ethical Considerations’ and mandatory ‘Dis-
ciplinary Rules.’  This structure was partly inspired by Fuller’s distinction between 
the moralities of aspiration and duty in The Morality of Law.”).  As Professor Owen 
Fiss further observes, Fuller’s theoretical approach to law has its foundation in the 
law of contract.  Owen M. Fiss, Foreward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
44 (1979); see also Luban, supra note 207, at 805 (“As Owen Fiss perceptively notes, 
Fuller was a contracts scholar who was not only more interested in private law than in 
public law, but who regarded private law as the template to which public law should 
mold itself.”).  Fuller’s contributions to contract law scholarship remain considerable.  
See, e.g., L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 
COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) [hereinafter Fuller, Consideration and Form]. 
 209. See Luban, supra note 207, at 807 (“One knows a priori, so to speak, how a 
Fullerian analysis of legal ethics should run.  There should be an outer morality con-
cerned with the content of legal representations, and perhaps with issues such as a 
lawyer’s honesty.  But the interesting part of the analysis would be an effort to dis-
cover an inner morality of the legal profession, that is, a morality that makes law 
practice possible.  The inner morality, professional ethics in the proper sense of the 
term, would consist of functional virtues and duties.” (emphasis added)). 
 210. See MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement. 
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of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only pro-
fessional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.211 
The Model Code, therefore, provides first-order ethical rules that came 
in an almost binary fashion – what one must do under the Disciplinary Rules, 
and what one should do under the Ethical Considerations.212  In this manner, 
conflicts of interest under the Model Code should be considered under both 
the mandatory rule, as to whether a conflict of interest in point of fact exists 
as enunciated in the Disciplinary Rules,213 as well as the possibility of an 
appearance of impropriety in the given case.214  This approach evolved, how-
ever, under the present formulation of first-order ethical rules for the legal 
profession – that is, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.215 
b.  Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which remain the primary 
source of first-order ethical rules for attorneys in the United States.216  In their 
formulation, the Model Rules had the intended purpose of “legalizing” the 
rules of legal ethics.217  In this sense, therefore, the Model Rules completed 
the task that the Model Code initiated – that is, a concerted effort to remove 
the rules of legal ethics from the vestiges of canonical prose, or the language 
of professional scripture.218  Such a development, while not inevitable,219 was 
  
 211. MODEL CODE EC 9-6 (emphasis added). 
 212. See MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement. 
 213. See MODEL CODE DR 5-102 to 5-107. 
 214. See MODEL CODE EC 9-6; infra Part III.A. 
 215. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibili-
ties, Scope (2012). 
 216. See MODEL RULES Preface. 
 217. See Hazard, The Future of Ethics, supra note 28, at 1241 (“[O]ver the last 
twenty-five years or so the traditional norms have undergone important changes.  One 
important development is that those norms have become ‘legalized.’  The rules of 
ethics have ceased to be internal to the profession; they have instead become a code of 
public law enforced by formal adjudicative disciplinary process.”). 
 218. See id. at 1250-51. 
 219. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 28, at 46 (“Geoffrey Hazard’s views of 
the transformation are particularly significant, because, as the Kutak Commission’s 
reporter who drafted the Model Rules, he occupies the dual role of chronicler and 
prime mover of the final stage of the transition.”).  Further, Daniel Reynolds served as 
Assistant Reporter to the Kutak Commission, and I especially thank Professor Rey-
nolds for his thoughtful comments on the arguments presented herein.  See infra note 
234. 
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nevertheless an improvement in the self-regulation of the legal profession.220  
In lieu of what may be considered as rather vague notions of “ethics” and 
“professionalism” that arguably obtained under the Model Code and certainly 
were set forth in the 1908 Canons, the Model Rules brought clarity and focus 
to the regulation of attorneys as a profession.221  The clarity brought by the 
Model Rules meant that vague notions of “ethics” and “professionalism” 
were no longer the criteria upon which one would determine whether particu-
lar conduct by an attorney was permissible or not.222  
As an example of the increased clarity, consider the manner in which the 
Model Rules addressed the issue of an “appearance of impropriety” in com-
parison to the approach taken under the Model Code, as discussed previ-
ously.223  In keeping with the aim of legalizing the rules of legal ethics, the 
Model Rules take the direct approach in that they discard the ethical consid-
eration of an appearance of impropriety from the conflict of interest rules.224  
The reasons for such an approach are persuasively explained in the commen-
tary to the Model Rules: 
The other rubric formerly used for dealing with disqualification is 
the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.  This rubric has a two-
fold problem.  First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to 
include any new client-lawyer relationship that might make a for-
mer client feel anxious.  If that meaning were adopted, disqualifi-
cation would become little more than a question of subjective 
judgment by the former client.  Second, since “impropriety” is un-
defined, the term “appearance of impropriety” is question-begging.  
It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of disqualifica-
tion cannot be properly resolved either by simply analogy to a law-
yer practicing alone or by the very general concept of appearance 
of impropriety.225 
Accordingly, the “appearance of impropriety” criterion is subject to 
compelling criticism in that it makes the test a subjective one where the opin-
ion of a former client will, more often than not, be decisive.226  Moreover, if 
the effort behind the Model Rules is to legalize legal ethics, then the appear-
  
 220. See Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 1249 (“What were 
fraternal norms issuing from an autonomous professional society have now been 
transformed into a body of judicially enforced regulations.”). 
 221. See id. 
 222. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 28, at 46-47. 
 223. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-6 (1981); supra Part 
II.D.1.a. 
 224. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.13 (2012). 
 225. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 5 (1995). 
 226. See id. 
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ance of impropriety test could not remain in the manner set forth in the Model 
Code.227  The criterion necessarily needed revision in order to move the test 
from a subjective to an objective one.228  As a consequence, the Model Rules 
in a certain sense reified the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code.229  This 
change, then, is the current state of affairs of the first-order ethical rules for 
the legal profession.230 
2.  Second-Order Ethical Rules 
In contrast to first-order ethical rules, for purposes of this discussion a 
second-order ethical rule is defined as a rule of ethics as may be prescribed by 
the competent authority.231  In this sense, the distinction between first-order 
and second-order ethical rules is primarily one of the rule-giver.232  In the 
case of first-order ethical rules, the relevant profession provides the ethical 
rules as a matter of self-regulation.233  As for second-order ethical rules, a 
  
 227. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 28, at 46-47.  To be sure, the assessment 
on such points will necessarily change when considering the important issues that 
concern conflict of interest scenarios for judges.  See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 1 (2011) (“A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, 
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the ap-
pearance of impropriety.”); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 322 (1969) 
(“The public is rightfully concerned with the interests of legislators, of lawyers, of 
businessmen and the basis on which their decisions are made.  The public rightfully is 
interested in the appearance of impropriety on the part of its judges, and the public’s 
judges should conform to the standards set forth many years ago by the thoughtful 
members of the legal profession and codified in the Canons of Judicial Ethics.”). 
 228. This struggle between subjective and objective criteria under law is not with-
out precedent.  Indeed, such a debate was the essential question in respect of the mod-
ern law of contractual formation.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 115 
(4th ed. 2004) (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had be-
come ascendant and courts universally accept it today.”). 
 229. See Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 1254; Luban & 
Millemann, supra note 28, at 46-47. 
 230. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 14 (2012) (“The Rules of 
Professional conduct are rules of reason.  They should be interpreted with reference to 
the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself.”). 
 231. With respect to an additional definition as to what may constitute a compe-
tent authority, I adopt such language in an effort to provide neutral language in fur-
therance of additional discussion.  See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 232. This additional quantifier of the rule-giver that is not the relevant profession 
is what transforms the first-order ethical rule into a second-order ethical rule.  See 
Enderton, supra note 181.  This is to say, for instance, that an attorney will always be 
subject to first-order ethical rules in connection with their licensure requirements with 
the relevant bar association.  However, such an attorney may or may not be subject to 
certain second-order ethical rules, depending on the areas in which she may or may 
not practice law. 
 233. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 10. 
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competent authority in some sense imposes rules of legal ethics onto the pro-
fession.234  The difference, therefore, is largely one of governance.235  With 
respect to first-order ethical rules, the professions, to some extent, decide 
what ethical rules will bind them.236  First-order ethical rules, therefore, can 
be seen as an effort by the professions to tie themselves to the mast, in a 
manner of speaking, when approaching the Sirens.237  On the other hand, 
second-order ethical rules are, by their very nature, imposed on the profes-
sions.238  And while the professions may or may not consent to such an impo-
sition of ethical rules, the critical distinction is that while such consent may 
be desired, it is by no means necessary. 
  
 234. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2012).  As a matter of legal history, 
however, it is important to note that the interplay between the relevant profession and 
a competent authority is often much more complex.  For instance, much of the content 
of the Attorney Conduct Rules was previously offered by the SEC prior to the adop-
tion of the Model Rules.  See Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed 
Counsel, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553, 581 (1988) (“The [SEC], for example, solic-
ited comments a number of years ago with respect to a rulemaking proposal initiated 
by the Georgetown Institute for Public Representation.  The proposal would have 
required annual certification by corporations of a certain size to the effect: (1) that its 
board of directors had instructed each lawyer employed or retained by the corporation 
to report any probable law violations of a certain qualitative or quantitative serious-
ness; (2) that the attorneys had done so; and (3) that the board had taken appropriate 
action with respect to the lawyer reports.  The response of the organized corporate bar 
was ferocious and directly attacked the SEC’s authority for such rulemaking, as well 
as certain specifics of the proposal itself.  These attacks, however, did not question the 
fundamental legal correctness of the proposal’s view of the lawyer-management role.  
In fact, however inadequately put, the proposal seems to have gotten it basically right.  
This was in 1979.  Soon thereafter, the Kutak Commission’s original version of Rule 
1.13 appeared.” (emphasis added)).  In this sense, therefore, much of what was right 
in 1979 did not come to fruition until 2002 with the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
associated promulgation of the Attorney Conduct Rules. 
 235. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES 
KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 2 (2008) (“Corporate governance is a broad descriptive term 
rather than a normative term.  Corporate governance describes all of the devices, 
institutions, and mechanisms by which corporations are governed.”). 
 236. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 12 (“The 
legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-
government.  The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are 
conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested 
concerns of the bar.”). 
 237. See Roosevelt, supra note 193 (“It shall not help us if we avoid the Scylla of 
baseness of motive, only to be wrecked on the Charybdis of wrong-headedness, of 
feebleness and inefficiency.”). 
 238. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7. 
39
Hines: Hines: Corporate Gatekeeper
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: HinesPaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 9:21 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:10 PM 
116 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
The occurrence of second-order ethical rules for the professions has par-
ticular salience for the corporate attorney.239  Indeed, it is in the case of the 
corporate attorney that we find in sharp relief the distinction between first-
order ethical rules and second-order rules.240  Accordingly, in considering the 
manner in which corporate attorneys concern themselves with second-order 
ethical rules, one may further explore the precise manner in which such rules 
may operate.241  The most notable example of second-order ethical rules for 
the corporate attorney remains, by general consensus, the Attorney Conduct 
Rules as enacted pursuant to the mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley.242 
a.  Attorney Conduct Rules 
Although the Attorney Conduct Rules are a matter deserving of ex-
tended discussion, for purposes of this categorization an overview of the no-
table provisions of such rules will be sufficient.243  Adopted by the SEC in 
2003 pursuant to section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley,244 the Attorney Conduct 
Rules have the stated purpose of “set[ting] forth minimum standards of pro-
fessional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the SEC in 
the representation of an issuer.”245  A key limitation, therefore, in the scope of 
the Attorney Conduct Rules is whether the attorney in question is 
  
 239. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate 
Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 204 (2000) [hereinafter Regan, Professional 
Responsibility] (“Corporate lawyers also tend to be in the vanguard of another emerg-
ing trend in legal practice: the subjection of lawyers to multiple sources of ethical 
governance.”). 
 240. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR. & JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND 
CORPORATE PRACTICE 729-30 (2005). 
 241. See id. at v (“The behavior of corporations and the professionals who advise 
them are now the object of a searching scrutiny.  Why, critics ask, didn’t the lawyers 
stop the looting, the fraud, and the manipulations of loopholes?”); Coffee, Under-
standing Enron, supra note 69, at 1405. 
 242. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.  See generally Simon M. Lorne, An Issue-
Annotated Version of the Sox Rules for Lawyer Conduct (2005), reprinted in REGAN 
& BAUMAN, supra note 240, at 712, 712-31. 
 243. For a more detailed discussion of the Attorney Conduct Rules, including the 
discussions that took place in connection with the passage of Section 307 of Sarbanes-
Oxley and the regulations promulgated thereunder, see COFFEE, supra note 14, at 216-
23; HAZEN, supra note 49, § 9.8; Koniak, supra note 99, at 1269-78. 
 244. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66).  
 245. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (“These standards supplement applicable standards of any 
jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices and are not intended to limit the 
ability of any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attorney not incon-
sistent with the application of this part.  Where the standards of a state or other United 
States jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices conflict with this part, 
this shall govern.”). 
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“[a]ppearing and practicing before the [SEC].”246  Further, the Attorney Con-
duct Rules read in a manner similar to the Disciplinary Rules under the 
Model Code,247 or the various rules provided in the Model Rules.248  In other 
words, the Attorney Conduct Rules are not drafted in a strictly aspirational 
sense as seen in the case of the 1908 Canons249 and the ethical considerations 
set forth in the Model Code.250  Rather, the Attorney Conduct Rules are more 
closely related to the Model Rules in that they seek to provide minimum 
standards of professional conduct that will apply in the case of an attorney 
that is appearing and practicing before the SEC.251 
In particular, the Attorney Conduct Rules set forth the now famous “up 
the ladder” reporting requirements for covered attorneys that become aware 
of “evidence of a material violation”252 by their corporate client.253  Impor-
tantly, the Attorney Conduct Rules provide that the duty to report evidence of 
a material violation is mandatory and thus is not a matter of personal discre-
tion.254  Further, this reporting duty remains mandatory in instances in which 
the attorney in question “reasonably believes”255 that the chief legal officer or 
chief executive officer has not provided an “appropriate response”256 to such 
  
 246. Id. § 205.2(a).  Notably, this defined term of “appearing and practicing be-
fore the [SEC]” does not include a “non-appearing foreign attorney.”  Id. § 
205.2(a)(2)(ii).  In turn, the phrase “non-appearing foreign attorney” has its own de-
fined term.  Id. § 205.2(j). 
 247. Compare id. § 205.3(b), with MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
101 (1981). 
 248. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.7 (2012). 
 249. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), with ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 
6 (1908). 
 250. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), with MODEL CODE EC 5-1. 
 251. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1; MODEL RULES Scope ¶ 14. 
 252. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (“Evidence of a material violation means credible evi-
dence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a 
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a ma-
terial violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”).  Further, the term 
“material violation” has its own definition.  Id. § 205.2(i) (“Material violation means 
a material violation of an applicable United States federal or state securities law, a 
material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States federal or state law, or a 
similar material violation of any United States federal or state law.”). 
 253. More specifically, the Attorney Conduct Rules employ the term “issuer” as 
further defined under federal securities laws.  See id. § 205.2(h). 
 254. Id. § 205.3(b). 
 255. See id. § 205.2(m) (“Reasonably believes means that an attorney believes the 
matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is not unreason-
able.”); see also id. § 205.2(l) (“Reasonable or reasonably denotes, with respect to the 
actions of an attorney, conduct that would not be unreasonable for a prudent and 
competent attorney.”). 
 256. See id. § 205.2(b) (providing an enumerated definition of what constitutes an 
“appropriate response”). 
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evidence of material violation.  In such cases, therefore, the attorney must 
report such evidence of material violation to the board of directors, the audit 
committee, or another uninterested committee of the board of directors in 
order to satisfy her duties under the Attorney Conduct Rules.257  Alterna-
tively, the attorney may be subject to a separate reporting procedure in cases 
where there is a “qualified legal compliance committee.”258  In either case, 
however, the Attorney Conduct Rules provide mandatory rules of profes-
sional conduct that operate in the fashion of second-order ethical rules.259 
Of note, the Attorney Conduct Rules specifically provide that they do 
not create a private right of action.260  Nevertheless, the Attorney Conduct 
Rules do provide that a violation thereof will subject an attorney to civil pen-
alties and remedies that apply in the case of a violation of federal securities 
laws.261  As one might imagine, therefore, attorneys appearing and practicing 
before the SEC must carefully consider their responsibilities under both first-
order and second-order ethical rules.262  Such considerations are without the 
scope of this Article.263  For the purposes of the present categorization, how-
ever, the nature and extent of ethical rules becomes clear – in both their first-
order and second-order formulations. 
III.   THE PRIMACY OF ETHICAL RULES OF THE CORPORATE 
GATEKEEPER 
With the foregoing categorization of conflicts of interest rules now 
complete, the discussion may now turn to the argument in favor of the pri-
macy of ethical rules for the corporate gatekeeper.264  This argument will be 
  
 257. Id. § 205.3(b)(3). 
 258. Id. § 205.3(c). 
 259. See id. § 205.3(b)-(c). 
 260. Id. § 205.7(a).  Additionally, the final rules promulgated by the SEC did not 
include the controversial “noisy withdrawal” provisions that were included in the 
proposed rule.  See Koniak, supra note 99, at 1274-78. 
 261. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(a). 
 262. Compare id. § 205.3(b), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 
(2012). 
 263. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13, in PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 2011-
2012 ed.) (“In August 2003, the ABA House of Delegates modified Model Rule 1.13 
to respond to the claims that the old rule did not permit lawyers to prevent corporate 
fraud which had a significant impact on their client’s financial wellbeing.”); Arnold 
Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43 
WASHBURN L.J. 61, 68-70 (2003) (discussing the Kutak Commission’s recommenda-
tion with respect to Model Rule 1.13). 
 264. As noted previously, the intended scope of this argument in favor of the 
primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper is in its potential application in 
the areas of corporate and securities law.  In this sense, therefore, ethical rules of the 
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made in two-parts: (a) by comparing the previously defined categories of 
conflicts rules,265 and (b) by arguing for an ethical perspective as to the cor-
porate gatekeeper.266 
A.  Ethical Rules and the Corporate Gatekeeper 
Reputation has long been an important factor in approaches to law.267  
Indeed, the inclusion of reputation in the form of reputational capital in legal 
theory has a long history within the law and economics schools of thought,268 
which inform to a considerable degree the important work in the area of gate-
keeper scholarship.269  Further, the application of reputation as a more spe-
cific criterion upon which to assess law has been explored in such varied ar-
  
corporate gatekeeper can be viewed as standing at the intersection of corporate law 
and legal ethics.  See supra note 13. 
 265. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 266. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 267. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 395-96 (1985) (“Reputation effects 
will deter defection from the letter and the spirit of an agreement in the degree to 
which (1) defections can be made public knowledge, (2) the consequences of defec-
tion can be fully ascertained (which will permit, among other things, real versus con-
trived claims of defection to be distinguished), and (3) parties who experience or 
observe defection penalize the offender and/or his successors in ‘full measure.’”). 
 268. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 80, at 287 (“The theory is that the law firm pro-
tects clients against the lawyer-client agency problem by posting a bond in the form 
of its reputation for client service and then monitoring the conduct of its member 
lawyers to prevent forfeiture of the reputational bond.”); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. 
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. 
ECON. 615, 616 (1981); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law 
Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1998) (“By posting reputational ‘bonds,’ 
large law firms help ensure that their lawyers serve client interests, including in ways 
that are not addressed by ethical rules.  The reputational bond is not only critical to an 
understanding of the large law firm’s role in reducing agency costs, but it also helps 
explain some otherwise puzzling aspects of law firm organization.”); Oliver E. Wil-
liamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. 
ECON. REV. 519, 529, 532 n.29 (1983). 
 269. See COFFEE, supra note 14, at 2-3; Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the 
Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 915 (1990) 
(“Here, then, is my best (and only) candidate for the next generation of private gate-
keeper: the inside lawyer.”); Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply 
to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 367 (2004) (“The central theoretical point is 
that reputational arguments related to gatekeepers are complex and reputation alone is 
not necessarily a viable constraint on gatekeeper certification.”); Andrew F. Tuch, 
Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1614 (2010) (“All this suggests that repu-
tations may not be well-calibrated to the quality of gatekeeper performance in past 
transactions and are thus noisy, or crude, indicators of gatekeeper performance.”). 
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eas of law such as international law,270 corporate law271 and international 
financial law.272   
While invoking the usage of the term “reputation” no doubt strongly 
suggests that important issues of law and policy are raised, the initial question 
that must be asked is – what is reputation?273  As a matter of etymology, the 
word “reputation” derives from the Latin reputatio, which means “the action 
of thinking about, consideration; a subject of thought, reflection.”274  Accord-
ingly, the word reputation may properly be considered as a term that connotes 
some manner of introspection.275  Contrasted with the modern usage of the 
word reputation, which is more typically associated with one’s regard within 
a community,276 this ancient and perhaps more precise definition of reputa-
tion has resonance in the ethical context.  For, in the words of Warren Buffett, 
if you think about your reputation as something that takes twenty years to 
build and five minutes to ruin, you will do things differently.277  With this 
definition of reputation in mind, we may now turn to the comparison of the 
categories of conflicts as has been set forth in the preceding pages of this 
Article.278 
  
 270. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law 15 (UC 
Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1112064, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112064 (“The reputation of a 
state is contingent on its past behavior but it is the knowledge that today’s conduct 
will affect tomorrow’s reputation that gives reputational sanctions their force.”). 
 271. Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 
46 (1995) (“What can be said with certainty is that the reputation model provides a 
powerful lens for examining the practice of corporate law.”). 
 272. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It 
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 286 (2011) (“As a result, noncompliance with key inter-
national standards, if discovered, will cause other countries to rethink or reevaluate 
their expectations concerning the regulator’s future behavior (or ‘reputation’).”). 
 273. See supra notes 153, 157. 
 274. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 1624 (1982). 
 275. See id.  One may also consider the additional meaning of reputatio as being 
“a consideration to be taken into account when drawing up a financial statement.”  
Id.; see infra Part III.A.2. 
 276. See Reputation Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www 
.oed.com/view/Entry/163228 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (defining reputation as “the 
condition, quality, or fact of being highly regarded or esteemed; credit, fame, distinc-
tion; respectability, good report.”). 
 277. See Editorial, supra note 2; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 36, at 1003 
(“The rules of legal ethics do in fact impose such an additional level of sanctions, as 
the attorney found to have engaged in an impermissible conflict of interest is subject 
to serious penalties, including loss of reputation, license suspension, or even dis-
barment – sanctions sufficient to make attorneys think twice about engaging in inap-
propriate conflicts of interest or disclosing client secrets or confidences to third par-
ties.”). 
 278. See supra Parts II.A-D. 
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1.  Comparison of the Categories of Conflicts Rules 
As a means of further developing the notion of the primacy of ethical 
rules of the corporate gatekeeper, it will be helpful to consider the manner in 
which the previously defined categories of conflicts rules interrelate.279  More 
specifically, a comparison of the categories of conflicts rules in respect of the 
positive and negative interests at issue for each of the professional qua gate-
keeper and the corporate client itself will be instructive.280  For when consid-
ering conflicts rules, the tension often lies with the respective responsibilities 
assumed by the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client.281  One 
might imagine an instance where the corporate client may wish to engage in 
certain illegal and perhaps even immoral conduct,282 but the professional qua 
gatekeeper must intervene as a matter of professional ethics.283  Cases of con-
flict of interest, therefore, are necessarily – in a phrase – conflicted.  And they 
are conflicted precisely in the sense that the interest of one party is set against 
the interest of another party.284 
Much of this makes intuitive sense, and indeed is reflected in the appli-
cable first-order ethical rules.285  But what does this import when comparing 
the various species of conflicts rules?  Are some conflicts rules more properly 
designed to address certain issues in law and policy than others?  And if so, 
what are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each of these spe-
cies of conflicts rules? In attempting to answer such questions, the rule maker 
will need to consider, at least to some degree, the precise manner of rule that 
will be employed.286  The rule maker, in this sense, must know what rules she 
  
 279. See supra Parts II.A-D. 
 280. The comparative approach remains an important method of inquiry in law 
and other disciplines.  See generally Roscoe Pound, What May We Expect From 
Comparative Law?, 22 A.B.A. J. 56, 59 (1936). 
 281. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, such tension is aptly cap-
tured with the language of adversity between the attorney and her client.  See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2012). 
 282. In making such an observation, we need not address the possible connection 
of law with morals.  See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 629 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidel-
ity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630-31 (1958).  Suf-
fice it to note that cases involving conflicts of interest will often raise questions that 
will implicate both law and morality, regardless of their connection with one another. 
 283. See MODEL RULES R. 1.13 (stating the up the ladder reporting requirement 
for attorneys of corporate clients); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2012) (referencing a duty to 
report evidence of an issuer-client’s material violations). 
 284. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7(a)(1). 
 285. See id. R. 1.7-1.13. 
 286. This said, the reality may well be that the rule maker has other more pressing 
considerations in mind, such as the need of a reelection.  Nevertheless, the point to be 
made is that if the law is to have any coherence, then some notion of the rule of law 
must obtain.  See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-41 (revised 
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is writing.287  And if this is indeed the case, then a categorization of conflicts 
rules will provide some structure through which the decision as to the particu-
lar rule that will be employed can be made.288  Here, therefore, is the intended 
purpose of the aforementioned categorization of conflicts rules. 
But prior to a specific consideration of each of the aforementioned cate-
gories, it may be helpful to first compare the positive and negative interests of 
each of the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client.  For the 
purpose of such a comparison, I will adopt a broad notion of “interest” for 
each of the parties in question.289  Thus, for the professional qua gatekeeper, 
the positive interest will be defined as matters that fall within the self-interest 
of such gatekeeper as a member of her chosen profession.290  The negative 
interest for such gatekeeper, therefore, will be the logical opposite – matters 
that fall without the self-interest of such gatekeeper as a member of her cho-
sen profession.291  Further to such descriptions, the positive interest of the 
corporate client will be defined as matters that fall within the self-interest of 
the corporate enterprise, broadly considered.  In turn, the negative interest of 
the corporate client will also be the logical opposite – that is to say, those 
matters that fall without the self-interest of the corporate enterprise, again in 
the broadest sense.292 
Here, the effort remains to provide both the reader and the author with a 
common language with which to engage in discussion.293  And while there 
may be other terms that would be seen as more attractive to the particular 
  
ed. 1969) [hereinafter . FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW]; HART, supra note 180, at 
80-81. 
 287. See generally David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 636, 650-54 (1983) (exploring the development of moral epistemology); Mat-
thias Steup, Epistemology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (DEC. 14, 2005), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/. 
 288. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 3-24. 
 289. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.7-1.13. 
 290. In this sense, the definition of the “positive interest” of the gatekeeper may 
be read to include the Brandeisian notion of the attorney acting in the public interest.  
See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 
313, 321 (1914).  However, such a reading cannot be read to the point that the gate-
keeper disappears as an entity that is separate and distinct from the public.  Accord-
ingly, the positive interest as defined herein can be viewed in the Brandeisian sense of 
being the public interest as may be expressed by the professional qua gatekeeper. 
 291. To be sure, there are an infinite number of cases where the positive interest 
and negative interest may blend into one another.  As a means, however, of develop-
ing the argument presented this distinction becomes necessary.  Accordingly, the 
distinction between the positive interest and negative interest can be viewed as apply-
ing in the marginal sense.  
 292. See supra notes 290-91. 
 293. See BISHIN & STONE, supra note 158, at vii (noting that the study of law is an 
“effort of the human mind to make ‘reality’ comprehendable and manageable” 
through language and philosophy). 
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reader, I ask that such reader take this proffered terminology in light of its 
intended purpose.294  I will note, however, that in using the term “self inter-
est” I do not mean to imply that such interests be considered in the narrow 
sense.  By this definition I mean that when invoking such language I am not 
making a particular claim for a normative ethical position.295  Rather, I seek 
to use the term “self interest” in a more specific sense – that is, the specific 
sense to the professional as a member of her chosen profession.296  Accord-
ingly, the self-interest in question is not solely a personal one.  Indeed, when 
considered as such, the self-interest in question is the interest of the profes-
sion itself as may be channeled through the particular professional under con-
sideration.297  This definition is a preferred approach to consider interests of 
the profession because this approach is how – one must imagine – profes-
sional ethics actually works.298  This is to say, while the first-order and sec-
ond-order ethical rules provide guidance, in the final analysis the ethical deci-
sion remains an individual one.299  Thus, the ethical choice for the profes-
sional qua gatekeeper is to consider her ethical duties and responsibilities as a 
member of her chosen profession. 
When considering the positive and negative interests of each of the pro-











 294. See supra note 27. 
 295. See WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 15 (2d ed. 1973) (“Ethical egoism holds 
that one is always to do what will promote his own greatest good – that an act or rule 
of action is right if and only if it promotes at least as great a balance of good over evil 
for him in the long run as any alternative would, and wrong if it does not.”). 
 296. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibili-
ties ¶ 1 (2012) (“A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of 
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility 
for the quality of justice.”). 
 297. Cf. Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra note 208, at 802 (“One who 
wishes to communicate his thoughts to others must force the raw material of meaning 
into defined and recognizable channels; he must reduce the fleeting entities of word-
less thought to the patterns of conventional speech.”). 
 298. See Regan, Professional Responsibility, supra note 239, at 214 (“[T]he trans-
formative character of corporate enterprise virtually guarantees that corporate lawyers 
perpetually will be facing dilemmas for which our existing professional responsibility 
framework provides imperfect guidance.”). 
 299. See id. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Positive and Negative Interests 
 
In every case, therefore, there will be four possible outcomes.300  There 
may be instances where the conflict rule in question can be seen as reading to 
the negative interest of the gatekeeper and the negative interest of the corpo-
ration.  This “double negative” circumstance is illustrated in the upper left 
quadrant of the matrix.301  Alternatively, the conflict rule may remain in the 
gatekeeper’s negative interest but may more properly be viewed as in the 
corporation’s positive interest.  Here, then, is the upper right quadrant.302  
But, of course, the “mixed” interest circumstance can turn on its head, 
whereby the conflict rule reads to the gatekeeper’s positive interest and the 
corporation’s negative interest.  This will be the lower left quadrant of the 
  
 300. But see supra note 291.  
 301. As a matter of optics, the “double negative” is written in shorthand as “Gate-
keeper Negative / Corporation Negative.” 
 302. This “mixed” interest circumstance is noted as “Gatekeeper Negative / Cor-
poration Positive.” 
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matrix.303  And, finally, there will be those instances where the conflict rule in 
question reads to the positive interest of both the gatekeeper and the corpora-
tion.  This is the lower right quadrant.304 
But this may all be seen as somewhat of an abstraction.305  Indeed, the 
close reader may say, although this structure is consistent in and of itself, it is 
merely that – a structure without substance.  I will concede that, at least in its 
initial outlines, such criticism has some merit.  Nevertheless, it is in bringing 
substance to such a form that we may more intensely consider the theoretical 
foundations of conflicts rules.306  And when applying the aforementioned 
categorization to such a substance, the following illustration comes into view: 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Categorized Conflicts Rules
 
  
 303. Accordingly, this “mixed” circumstance carries the label “Gatekeeper Posi-
tive / Corporation Negative.” 
 304. This final quadrant is described as “Gatekeeper Positive / Corporation Posi-
tive.” 
 305. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93 (1986) (“[W]e might understand 
law better if we could find a similar abstract description of the point of law most legal 
theorists accept so that their arguments take place on the plateau it furnishes . . . . 
[J]urisprudence [does not] depend on finding an abstract description of that sort.”). 
 306. See Hines, supra note 1, at 42 n.46 (noting the importance of examining a 
theory in order to understand its problem-solving capabilities). 
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Activity rules occupy the upper left quadrant because they are, by defi-
nition, rules of limitation.307  Thus, the corporation cannot receive certain 
consulting services from its auditor, even though the auditor might provide 
the most desirable consulting services on such matters in the market.308  Such 
a rule will benefit neither party – the auditor will lose the business of such 
consulting services, and the corporation will not receive the services it seeks 
from its auditor.309  In turn, liability rules rests in the upper right quadrant in 
that the corporation would prefer to place the blame on the gatekeeper by 
pointing the finger.310  Understandably, the gatekeeper would rather not have 
this finger pointed in her direction, and will therefore view such liability rules 
from a negative perspective.  Disclosure rules sit in the lower left quadrant for 
similar reasons.  The gatekeeper would likely prefer the corporation to clear 
the air by going public with, for instance, a press release that would correct 
any continuing fraud that may exist within the market.311  In contrast, the 
corporation will understandably be reluctant to make such disclosure because 
it will bring to light an otherwise hidden wrong. 
But what then of the lower right hand quadrant?  Here, I argue, is where 
ethical rules lie.  For it is in the clear interest of the gatekeeper to maintain 
her status within the market as a professional, and in so doing she must up-
hold the stated ethical requirements of her chosen profession.312  Further, the 
corporation seeks the services of the gatekeeper precisely because she is a 
professional – she provides a specialized service that the corporation cannot 
obtain solely on its own.313  Ethical rules are, in this sense, a necessity for 
both the gatekeeper and the corporation.314  As a consequence, ethical rules 
occupy a primary position within the constellation of conflicts rules.315  This 
is not to say, of course, that activity rules, liability rules, and disclosure rules 
have no relevance when assessing conflicts of interest rules within the ambit 
of corporate and securities law.316  Quite the contrary – the rule maker, when 
  
 307. See supra Part II.A. 
 308. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(1)-(9) (2006). 
 309. See generally COFFEE, supra note 14, at 146-52 (examining changes within 
the auditing profession that increase conflicts with clients). 
 310. See supra Part II.B; supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra Part II.C; see generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 
(1988). 
 312. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 19 (2012). 
 313. See Gilson, supra note 269, at 889. 
 314. See Regan, Professional Responsibility, supra note 239, at 214 (“Directives 
must have an aspirational, rather than merely descriptive, character.  This unavoidably 
requires reflection upon the roles we believe lawyers should play and the normative 
commitments they should seek to realize.”). 
 315. See supra note 27. 
 316. See supra note 27. 
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considering possible alternatives in federal securities law, must consider such 
rules.317  But it must first begin with the ethical rules.  For without the ethical 
rules, the entire structure of gatekeeper enforcement in the various profes-
sions will collapse like so many houses of cards.318  The primacy of ethical 
rules, therefore, obtains in the context of corporate and securities law where 
the gatekeeper is an actor.319 
2.  The Corporate Gatekeeper in Ethical Perspective 
If we may then agree that ethical rules occupy a primary position within 
the various categories of conflicts rules, what ethical rule should be under 
consideration in the present state of affairs in corporate and securities law?320  
Here, I argue that an ethical perspective within the context of corporate and 
securities law is necessary.321  More specifically, by providing additional 
legal rules that will build upon the notion of an ethical perspective as to the 
corporate gatekeeper, the landscape within corporate and securities law will, 
hopefully, improve for the better.322  And in facilitating the process by which 
the gatekeeper thinks, considers, and reflects upon her actions, the intention is 
that better decisions will ultimately be made. 
Although one can imagine a host of potential changes in law that will 
build upon this notion of the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gate-
keeper, at the present time perhaps further analysis of forthcoming proxy 
disclosures may provide additional information of interest.323  Here, I have in 
  
 317. See supra note 27. 
 318. See generally SORKIN, supra note 6. 
 319. Further to this notion of the primacy of ethical rules, the potential benefits of 
such an approach can be more specifically enunciated within the context of federal 
securities law enforcement.  For instance, imagine that in the given case that the gate-
keeper or her client engages in certain conduct that arguably may be in violation of an 
ethical rule, in either its first-order or second-order formulations.  In such a case, the 
violation of such an ethical rule could have probative value in assessing whether the 
gatekeeper or her client engaged in conduct sufficient to satisfy the state of mind 
requirement in Section 10(b) actions.  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976) (holding that allegations of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud are re-
quired for a private right of action in a Section 10(b) action).  Accordingly, the viola-
tion of an ethical rule can provide additional information and context to the determi-
nation of a possible violation of a liability rule.  In this sense, an incentive-based 
approach to ethical rules – and in particular the assessment of penalties for the viola-
tion thereof – can be seen as the interplay between ethical rules and liability rules.  
See generally POSNER, supra note 44, § 12.4. 
 320. See Regan, Professional Responsibility, supra note 239, at 204. 
 321. See generally Koniak, supra note 99, at 1278-80. 
 322. See generally id. 
 323. More specifically, such analysis would be of disclosure rules in the first 
instance, as such category has been defined for purposes of this article.  See supra 
Part II.C. 
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mind the final rule on Compensation Committee independence standards as 
part of the Dodd-Frank reforms.324  If the effort is to facilitate an ethical per-
spective as to the corporate gatekeeper, then perhaps encouraging such an 
approach by means of the disclosure rules may be a helpful way to start.325  
Accordingly, in reviewing the forthcoming proxy disclosure as mandated by 
the final rule, we may be able to achieve a better understanding as to how 
such issues are addressed by market actors.326 
On this point, one can imagine that careful consideration of conflicts al-
ready takes within the practice of law.  For instance, imagine a partners’ 
meeting at a leading law firm in the United States.327  Assume, for the mo-
ment, that a potential engagement raises a conflict of interest.  At some point, 
the discussion may turn to the questions – do we really want to take on this 
representation?  Is this who we are?  How will this affect our reputation?  
And if such discussion already takes place within the practice of law,328 
  
 324. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5301-5641). 
 325. See BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 118, at 92 (“Publicity is 
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).  But see 
Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean: 
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (2005). 
 326. See generally Dodd-Frank Act § 952.  In considering additional ethical rules 
along such lines, the action – that is, the manifested behavior – of the professional qua 
gatekeeper could be constructed in such fashion as to constitute a formality of sorts.  
See Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra note 208, at 805 (“Forms must be reserved 
for relatively important transactions.  We must preserve a proportion between means 
and end; it will scarcely do to require a sealed and witnessed document for the effec-
tive sale of a loaf of bread.”).  Although the focus of the discussion will likely then 
turn to the nature and quality of the formality in question, the specifics of any such 
formality will undoubtedly be subject to the political process.  See POSNER, supra 
note 44, § 19.3.  Nevertheless, one senses that – as a matter of legal theory – the key 
move in the extended discussion of doctrine will have been made.  The question, 
therefore, will become one of competing formalities.  See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7201-66) (chief executive officer and chief financial officer certification of 
financial statements of reporting companies). 
 327. See, e.g., RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 186, at 32-35. 
 328. Within the practice of law, this brief hypothetical will admittedly be much 
more complex.  For instance, one imagines that the respective ethical concerns for 
actors within the law firm will be quite different.  Senior Partner W with equity in the 
firm will stand in a different position from Junior Partner X, who may have little or no 
equity at all.  Further, Senior Associate Y may have a different perspective than Jun-
ior Associate Z.  However, one supposes that both will stand in a different position 
from legal assistants and staff who are not subject to rules of professional ethics in 
connection with state bar licensure requirements.  Moreover, the respective risk to 
reputation as opposed to opportunity of an optimum of professional performance – 
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should not the applicable federal regulations further reflect the concerns that 
are raised by ethical rules?329  The potential benefits of such revisions can be 
seen as four-fold: (i) the relevant profession will more proactively address 
matters of conflicts of interest through individual cases;330 (ii) the profes-
sional qua gatekeeper will be reminded of the importance of preserving her 
reputational capital;331 (iii) a potential collective action problem will be ad-
dressed in that an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper will be 
universally applied to the gatekeepers in question;332 and (iv) the normative 
ends of justice, such as they are, may be more fully achieved by focusing the 
attention of both the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client.333 
In taking such steps to facilitate introspection by the professional qua 
gatekeeper, we may then achieve some measure of consideration of ethical 
rules in the difficult case.334  While it is far from clear that this will in fact 
occur, at the least the law will have provided an additional method by which 
  
that is to say, a “happy” client – will necessarily be different for attorneys within the 
law firm, given their level of involvement in the relevant case or transaction.  Thus, 
an attorney with no part in an engagement that subsequently ruins the reputation of 
the firm in five minutes will in this sense lose the reputation of the firm that she may 
have helped build over twenty years.  Here, recall the accounting fraud scandals – 
Enron, Worldcom and the rest – as well as the most notable instances from the finan-
cial crisis – Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, etc.  See Hines, supra note 1, at 34-38.  
In the case of the large firm, therefore, this asymmetry of reputational effects will be 
an important issue to consider as a matter of firm governance and, more broadly, by 
the professions as a matter of their self-regulation.  My thanks to Professor Hazard in 
providing me with these insightful thoughts. 
 329. By definition, such an ethical rule would constitute a second-order ethical 
rule.  See supra Part II.D.2.  Further, such a second-order ethical rule can be viewed 
as the means by which ethical decision, such as it is, may be channeled by the profes-
sional qua gatekeeper.  See, e.g., Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra note 208, at 
802. 
 330. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIL MORALS 13 
(Cornelia Brookfield trans., Greenwood Press 1983) (1950) (“A system of ethics, 
however, is not to be improvised.  It is the task of the very group to which they are to 
apply.”); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 67 (1978) 
(“[A]cting as lawyer for the situation can be thought of as similar to a doctor’s 
‘authority’ to terminate the life of a hopeless patient: It can be properly undertaken 
only if it will not be questioned afterwards.”). 
 331. See supra notes 267-78 and accompanying text. 
 332. See, e.g., Steven Kuhn, Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Oct. 22, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.  Here, the issue of 
reputational asymmetry remains an important issue for consideration.  See supra note 
328.  
 333. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 36, at 1102-05. 
 334. In this sense, the law may then approach the Fullerian notion of an inner 
morality in cases where the professional qua gatekeeper undertakes such a meditation 
on her professional responsibilities.  See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 
286, at 41-44; Luban, supra note 207, at 807. 
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such consideration may take place – from an ethical perspective.335  And the 
specific manner in which such consideration takes place will be in the as-
sessment by the professional qua gatekeeper of her reputation – that fleeting 
thing that takes twenty years to build and five minutes to ruin.336 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The classification of conflicts of interest remains one of the enduring 
challenges in both corporate law and legal ethics in that it raises fundamental 
questions as to the proper role of the professional qua gatekeeper.337  And 
while such a classification can never truly be complete,338 an attempt to con-
sider the ethical implications of such conflicts does, in a certain sense, engage 
with both the burdens and responsibilities of professional practice.339  As the 
Model Rules note in their Preamble on a Lawyer’s Responsibilities: 
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities 
are encountered.  Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from 
conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal 
system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical 
person while earning a satisfactory living.  The Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts.  
Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult is-
sues of professional discretion can arise.  Such issues must be re-
solved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral 
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.  
These principles include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to pro-
tect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of 
the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil atti-
tude toward all persons involved in the legal system.340 
The foregoing discussion of the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate 
gatekeeper hopefully furthers the discussion on the professional, ethical, and 
moral dilemmas that may be encountered by the professional in practice.341  
Moreover, in this Article’s review of the recent changes to proxy disclosures 
  
 335. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981). 
 336. See Editorial, supra note 2. 
 337. See COFFEE, supra note 14, at 365 (“In principle, the professions should be 
uniquely sensitive to the dangers surrounding conflicts of interest.  Still, the 1990s 
revealed little, if any, evidence of self-restraint.”). 
 338. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 210. 
 339. See Fried, supra note 172, at 1061. 
 340. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 
9 (2012). 
 341. See Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1-2 n.1. 
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rules342 – that is, ethical rules of the second-order – the corporate gatekeeper 
may be reconsidered from the perspective of those rules prescribed by the 
professions themselves – that is to say, ethical rules of the first-order. 
 
  
 342. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
5301-5641). 
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